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INTRODUCTION
1

Although New York Times v. Sullivan purported to shield the press
2
from liability in defamation suits brought by public officers, juries
have found for plaintiffs in more than half of the cases decided under
3
the actual malice standard. Damages in those cases often amount to
4
millions of dollars, and many of the judgments are founded on
5
dubious evidence of actual malice. Accordingly, four decades after
the Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision, scholars
have disparaged Sullivan for imposing its own chilling effect on the
6
press through massive awards and increased litigation costs.
The actual malice standard has also been criticized for
7
inadequately protecting the reputations of plaintiffs. Victims of
defamatory news reports are immediately placed in defensive

1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. See id. at 278–80 (establishing the rule that publications shall not be subject
to liability for defamation absent a showing of actual malice, under the reasoning
that any lesser standard exposing publications to greater liability would effectively
restrict the press’ freedom and the public’s freedom to access information).
3. MEDIA LAW RESEARCH CENTER, MLRC 2004 REPORT ON TRIALS AND DAMAGES,
MLRC BULLETIN 63, tbl. 5 (Feb. 2004).
4. See id. at 28, tbl. 8 (reporting that the average award in libel suits is more than
$2.25 million). Note that the tables do not account for settlements and cases that
otherwise did not make it to trial. In this sense, they are incomplete, but the point
remains that damages in cases involving the actual malice standard can, and often
do, reach startling amounts. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The
Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1983) (providing an
overview of the growth of mega-awards in defamation suits against media
defendants).
5. See generally Brian C. Murchison et al., Sullivan’s Paradox: The Emergence of
Judicial Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7, 95 (1994) (discussing the use of
circumstantial evidence by trial courts in contravention of Sullivan).
6. See infra notes 120–123 (describing the restrictive effect of large jury awards
and litigation costs on media defendants and freedom of the press).
7. See infra Part I.B.
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postures and cannot shield themselves from public scorn. When
those plaintiffs are denied their day in court, they have little recourse
to reclaim their good names. To make matters worse, reputational
injuries seem inevitable following Sullivan because the actual malice
standard does not deter the press from negligently investigating leads
9
and reviewing stories. Indeed, Sullivan incentivizes practices that
increase the likelihood that the press will publish injurious
10
falsehoods.
But hope is not lost for the actual malice standard. Sullivan should
be rescued rather than replaced, albeit in an unconventional
manner. This Article proposes to reform libel litigation by creating a
summary proceeding through which media defendants can shield
themselves from liability by proving that they complied with a
baseline standard of responsible journalism. The proposed standard
would eliminate the chilling effect on the press by substantially
reducing both litigation costs and the likelihood of damage awards.
For victims of defamation, the proposed standard would prevent
reputational injuries by deterring negligent reporting and providing
defamed individuals with outlets for counterspeech.
Most
importantly, the proposed standard would safeguard the
fundamental constitutional interests driving the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in libel cases by ensuring that public debate is founded
on information that has been thoroughly investigated and fact11
checked.
Part I of this Article briefly examines Sullivan and the progression
of modern libel law. Part II discusses the tripartite failures of the
actual malice standard that necessitate its reform. Part III argues that
the First Amendment requires that the Supreme Court restructure
the constitutional regime of defamation law to promote a baseline
standard of journalistic professionalism. Finally, Part IV proposes the
creation of a summary proceeding that both resolves the three
failures of the actual malice standard and furthers the constitutional

8. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1971)
(elaborating on the notion that the public is far more attentive to the defamation of
a prominent individual than to any subsequent denial of the substance of the
defamation, and so counterspeech is an inadequate recourse for defamed
individuals).
9. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964) (acknowledging
that the New York Times engaged in negligent behavior, but still not holding the
newspaper liable for those negligent practices).
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. h (1977)
(contrasting the important interest in informing the public on serious matters with
the far less important interest in spreading gossip).

BARRON.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

76

10/5/2007 7:14:00 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1

12

mandate for a responsible press.
This Article concludes by
addressing potential objections to the proposed summary
proceeding.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT DEFAMATION
JURISPRUDENCE

Until its landmark holding in Sullivan, the Supreme Court’s
construction of the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment
13
aligned closely to early English common law.
Under that
conception of the First Amendment, the government was proscribed
from imposing prior restraints on libels, while subsequent
14
punishment of false speech was permitted. Accordingly, in a series
of decisions throughout the early twentieth century, the Court
repeatedly held that the First Amendment does not protect the press
from defamation liability. The two most notable decisions in this line
15
16
were Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire and Beauharnais v. Illinois. In
Chaplinsky, the Court famously created a two-tier conception of the
First Amendment, holding,
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been

12. See Smolla, supra note 4, at 84 (pointing out the diminished social utility of
speech when its veracity is questionable).
13. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714–15 (1931) (affirming that the
First Amendment prohibits prior restraints of the press, but refusing to decide
whether it also prohibits subsequent punishment).
14. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *152 (discussing the elimination
of the British ex ante licensing requirement, and stating that “where blasphemous,
immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are punished by
the English law . . . the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means
infringed or violated”). It is unclear whether the Framers intended the protections
of the First Amendment to extend beyond those recognized under English common
law. The version of the press clause first proposed by James Madison that provided
that “the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be
inviolable,” was substantially curtailed to its current form. See Leonard Levy, The
Legacy Reexamined, 37 STAN. L. REV. 767, 790 n.107 (1985) (citing James Madison’s
June 8, 1789 proposal). Outside of this small amount of legislative history, there is
no evidence that the first Congress debated the scope of the First Amendment’s
protection of the press. See id. at 767 (“[E]ven if the amendment had a broader
reach, the ‘freedom of the press’ it originally protected was freedom from licensing,
censorship, and other forms of prior restraint.”); see also David A. Anderson, The
Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 475-80 (1983) (discussing the division
between the early Federalists and the Madisonians regarding the breadth of the First
Amendment following the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798); Gerald A. Berlin,
Reviews, 72 YALE L.J. 631, 631-38 (1963) (commenting on LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY
OF SUPPRESSION (1960), and arguing that Professor Levy failed to fully account for the
opposition of early colonists to the imposition of ex post punishment for seditious
libel following the trial of John Peter Zenger).
15. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
16. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
17
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.

In Beauharnais, the Court reaffirmed Chaplinsky and held that libel is
18
not “within the area of constitutionally protected speech.”
Sullivan marked a radical shift from the view propounded in
Chaplinsky and Beauharnais, as it was the first case in which the Court
held that the First Amendment grants limited protection from
19
subsequent liability for the publication of defamatory statements. At
issue in Sullivan was a one-page political advertisement placed in the
New York Times (“the Times”) that contained false statements
regarding police treatment of African Americans in Montgomery,
20
Alabama.
The respondent, L. B. Sullivan, was an elected
commissioner in Montgomery whose duties included oversight of the
21
city’s police department. Although Sullivan was not named in the
advertisement, he argued that the false statements implicitly referred
22
to his office and thereby defamed him through his supervisory role.

17. 315 U.S. at 571–72. The Court in Chaplinsky also noted its holding in Near
and stated that “[t]he protection of the First Amendment . . . is not limited to the
Blackstonian idea that freedom of the press means only freedom from restraint prior
to publication.” Id. at 572 n.3. Interestingly, the Court failed to explain how its view
of libel as falling outside the scope of the First Amendment did not render prior
restraints of defamatory speech constitutionally permissible.
18. 343 U.S. at 266. While the Supreme Court in Sullivan overruled Chaplinsky
insofar as it extended First Amendment protection to libelous speech, Chaplinsky
survived in theory. As the Court noted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1974), false statements of fact have “no constitutional value” and fall under the
umbrella of unprotected speech discussed in Chaplinsky.
19. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 291-92 (1964).
20. Id. at 256–58.
21. Id. at 256.
22. Sullivan pointed to two paragraphs of the advertisement in particular. The
third paragraph stated:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang ‘My Country, ‘Tis of Thee’ on
the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and
truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama
State College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state
authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an
attempt to starve them into submission.
Id. at 257. As the Court noted, Montgomery police were not present at the
demonstration. Moreover, the students were expelled not for the protest, but for
demanding service of the lunch counter at the local county church. The campus
dining hall was not padlocked. Id. at 259.
Sullivan also highlighted the advertisement’s sixth paragraph, which alleged,
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Both before and after the Times published the advertisement, its
23
No
employees engaged in questionable journalistic practices.
employee of the Times attempted to fact-check the information in the
advertisement, despite the existence of Times articles discussing some
of the events described in the advertisement, and the presence of at
24
least one Times “stringer” reporter in Alabama. The manager of
Advertisement Accountability at the Times approved the
advertisement for publication because its text was subscribed with the
names of sixty-four prominent political, religious, and cultural
25
leaders—all of whom the manager believed were credible. None of
the individuals, however, authorized the use of their name, nor were
26
any made aware of the advertisement prior to its publication. The
Times advertising editors failed to contact any of the advertisement’s
supposed sponsors to confirm that they had consented to be
27
signatories.
Sullivan notified the Times of the false statements
shortly after they were published, but its editors refused to publish a
retraction because they did not believe that the statements about
Montgomery police officers’ conduct implicated Sullivan’s

Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King’s peaceful
protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost
killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have
arrested him seven times⎯for “speeding,” “loitering” and similar “offenses.”
And now they have charged him with “perjury”⎯a felony under which they
could imprison him for ten years.
Id. at 257-58. Sullivan argued that the use of the term “they” regarding the seven
arrests referred to conduct by Montgomery police officers, and that the other uses of
“they” therefore also imputed police misconduct. Id. at 258. Regarding this
paragraph, the Court noted that Dr. King was arrested four times, and that the
alleged assault was denied by one of the accused police officers. Id. at 259.
It was uncontroverted at trial that some of the statements in those paragraphs were
false. Id. at 258.
23. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 50-51 (Ala. 1962) (noting that
despite the newspaper’s own finding from an internal investigation that there was no
truth to the allegations in the advertisement, the Times refused to publish a
retraction until forced), rev’d, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). According to the Supreme Court
of Alabama, “[i]n the face of this cavalier ignoring of the falsity of the advertisement,
the jury could not have but been impressed with the bad faith of The Times, and its
maliciousness inferable therefrom.” Id. at 51.
24. Id. at 46; see id. at 29 (explaining that the term “stringer” typically refers to an
on-site news correspondent employed by another news agency, who is occasionally
asked for reports).
25. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 261. The signatories included Eleanor Roosevelt, Harry
Belafonte, Marlon Brando, Nat King Cole, Sammy Davis, Jr., and Shelley Winters.
Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at L25, available at
http://1stam.umn.edu/a
rchive/primary/sullivan.pdf.
26. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 260.
27. Id.
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28

reputation.
Eventually, the Times published a retraction after
29
receiving a complaint from the Governor of Alabama.
Following a trial in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, a jury
awarded Sullivan $500,000 in presumed and punitive damages, which
30
was the exact amount he sought.
The Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment, holding that the statements referred to
31
Sullivan and were libelous per se. The state high court, however,
devoted little of its attention to the First Amendment and primarily
32
discussed procedural issues.
On certiorari, Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Supreme
Court, which unanimously reversed the decision of the state high
33
court. The Court noted that it could have reversed solely on the
narrow ground that the references to the police in the advertisement
were insufficient to establish a cause of action for the defamation of
34
an unnamed county commissioner. Nevertheless, the Court instead
reversed on the novel ground that absent a showing that the
defamatory speech was uttered with actual malice, the First
Amendment prohibits a public official from recovering for allegedly
35
defamatory statements relating to his official conduct. To establish
actual malice, the public official must prove with “convincing clarity”
that the speaker uttered the statement with knowledge of its
36
falsehood or with reckless disregard of its veracity.
The Court was primarily concerned that liability for defamation
37
would deter the press from reporting on political matters. Justice
Brennan noted that civil liability imposes a greater chilling effect on
the media than prosecution for seditious libel, as civil defendants face
38
the possibility of massive damages. Also, because civil defendants
lack protection from double jeopardy, they may face multiple lawsuits
39
for a single libelous statement. Public officials could thereby impose
“virtually unlimited” damages on journalists in addition to the costs of
28. Id. at 257, 261–62.
29. Id. at 261–62.
30. Id. at 256.
31. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 49-51 (Ala. 1962) (adopting the
rationale of Johnson Publ’g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441 (Ala. 1960)), rev’d, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
32. Id. at 30-39.
33. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292.
34. Id. at 264–65.
35. See id. at 269 (noting that “libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations”).
36. Id. at 285-86.
37. Id. at 297 (Black, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 277 (majority opinion).
39. Id. at 278.
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litigating multiple lawsuits, such that they could keep the press from
40
publishing materials critical of the government. Thus, the Court
held that the Constitution tolerates the dissemination of some false
41
statements to ensure unfettered press coverage of political matters.
The Court also moved libel law into the scope of the First
Amendment to prevent courts motivated by local biases from
42
imposing liability on the press. Although they did not discuss it in
Sullivan, Justice Brennan and his peers were aware of evidence
indicating that the trial of the Times was tainted with racism, as well as
anger over the intrusion of a northern newspaper into local southern
43
affairs.
Despite the judgment of the state trial court, Sullivan’s
reputation was probably not substantially injured by the
44
advertisement. In fact, Sullivan remained popular in Montgomery,
and many Montgomery residents were outraged by the
45
Moreover, the Court was concerned that the
advertisement.
availability of damages for libel threatened the financial viability of
46
newspapers. By the time the case was decided, the Times faced five
other defamation suits in Alabama, with liability potentially as high as

40. Id. at 278-79.
41. See id. at 271–72 (“[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . .
it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’
that they ‘need to survive.’” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
42. See id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring) (“Montgomery is one of the localities in
which widespread hostility to desegregation has been manifested. This hostility has
sometimes extended itself to persons who favor desegregation, particularly to socalled ‘outside agitators,’ a term which can be made to fit papers like the Times,
which is published in New York.”).
43. See W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER TIMES V.
SULLIVAN 14-15 (1989); see also Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Brief in Opposition
at 3, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 609) (arguing that racial bias
and community pressures led to violations of due process in the state courts); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 200 (1964) (observing that Alabama took
advantage of its opportunity to draw attention to the Times’ participation in the civil
rights movement in the South).
44. See HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 17 (noting Sullivan’s own testimony that he did
not suffer any loss in compensation or face the threat of termination).
45. See id. at 12–14 (detailing the testimony of six witnesses, all of whom stated
that they did not believe the advertisement was true, and even if it was, they thought
no less of Sullivan because of it); see also ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION:
LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 1.2.2 (2006) (pointing out that several
other libel suits were brought against the Times by state and local officials, such that
outsiders were punished for expression of unpopular views despite no apparent
harm to the public officials’ reputations).
46. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 294 (Black, J., concurring) (“The half-million-dollar
verdict does give dramatic proof, however, that state libel laws threaten the very
existence of an American press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public
affairs and bold enough to criticize the conduct of public officials.”).
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$2 million in addition to the cost of litigating the cases hundreds of
47
miles from New York.
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court held that the evidence
offered at trial was insufficient to support a finding that the Times’
48
published the advertisement with actual malice. Justice Brennan
first held that the Times’ advertising manager held a good faith and
reasonable belief that the advertisement was “substantially true,” and
he therefore did not maliciously approve of the advertisement’s
49
publication. The newspaper’s failure to check the accuracy of the
statements against its own stories or contact any of the
advertisement’s signatories was insufficient to show that the Times
reporters and editors knew the statements were false or acted with
50
reckless disregard of its veracity. Likewise, the Court held that the
newspaper’s failure to retract the advertisement could not serve as
51
At most, the facts supported a
retroactive evidence of malice.
finding of “negligence in failing to discover the misstatements,”
which is “constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that is
52
required for a finding of actual malice.”
From the outset of its holding in Sullivan, the Court was divided as
to the extent to which the First Amendment protects libelous
statements. Indeed, although Sullivan was a unanimous decision,
only six justices supported the actual malice standard. Justices Black,
Goldberg, and Douglas rejected the standard, arguing instead that
the Constitution should provide absolute protection for speech about
53
public officials. In his concurrence, Justice Black argued,
‘Malice,’ even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract
concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that
malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the
right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not
47. Id. at 278 n.18 (majority opinion).
48. Id. at 287–88.
49. See id. at 286 (refusing to adopt the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion
that malice could be inferred from the fact that the advertising manager ignored the
falsity of the advertisement).
50. The Court, however, held that the actual malice standard would be satisfied if
those stories were brought to the attention of the Times employees responsible for
the publication of the advertisement. Id. at 287.
51. Id. at 286–87.
52. Id. at 287–88.
Professor Richard Epstein argued that this holding
represented the Supreme Court’s attempt to strike a balance between absolute
protection for the press (i.e., a no-liability standard), and strict liability for the
publication of injurious falsehoods. Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v.
Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 801-02 (1986) in THE COST OF LIBEL:
ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 137–47 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds.,
1989).
53. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293–305 (Black, J., concurring).
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measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First
54
Amendment.

Moreover, he stated that determining liability remained at the whim
of potentially biased factfinders, such that government officials were
55
still capable of harassing the press.
Justice Goldberg separately
argued that the actual malice standard would lead to juror confusion,
and that the right to speak about public matters should be
independent of “a probing by the jury of the motivation of the citizen
56
or press.”
In the decade that followed Sullivan, the Supreme Court further
developed the actual malice standard in a series of fractured
57
decisions.
Among the first matters addressed by the Court was
whether the actual malice standard sufficiently accommodates the
interest in protecting plaintiffs’ reputations, and whether that interest
58
is constitutional or state-held.
The Court came closest to
recognizing a constitutional right to reputation in a concurrence by
59
Justice Stewart in Rosenblatt v. Baer, in which he famously argued,
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of
life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our
60
constitutional system.

A year later, Justice Harlan wrote for a plurality of the Court that the
First Amendment protection of speech must be balanced against the
“pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks on
61
reputation.”

54. Id. at 293.
55. See id. at 294–95 (noting that invidious motivations to harass the press are not
limited to racial bias).
56. Id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
57. See infra notes 58-62.
58. See Smolla, supra note 4, at 33-35 (discussing the Court’s open invitation in
Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) for states to develop a suitable
standard of liability in defamation suits because it would be unwise for the Court to
balance constitutional claims of the press against reputational claims of plaintiffs on
an ad hoc basis).
59. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
60. Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
61. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 146–47 (1967) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 (majority opinion)) (internal quotations omitted).
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Despite these statements, the Court held in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
62
Inc. that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting plaintiffs’
reputations, but that the actual malice standard does not necessarily
interfere with that interest. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell
agreed that the First Amendment requires a balancing between two
competing interests: the state interest in protecting plaintiffs’
reputations and the press’ constitutional interest in immunity from
63
liability. Gertz held that the Sullivan standard accommodates those
interests by limiting the protection of the press to statements made
64
about public officials and figures.
Justice Powell offered two arguments that the interest in the
reputations of both public officials and figures are accommodated by
the actual malice standard. First, individuals who enter the public
limelight are subject to public scrutiny and thus, assume the risk of
65
Second, prominent
being the targets of defamatory statements.
individuals can use their publicity to issue counterspeech and thereby
66
rectify the injury caused by false statements. Noting that the “first
remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using available
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error,” the Court
held that private citizens are at a substantial disadvantage in
remedying injuries to their reputation than are individuals in the
67
public eye. For that reason, the actual malice standard was limited
68
in application to suits brought by public officials or figures.
II. THE TRIPARTITE FAILURES OF THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD
Just after the Supreme Court decided Sullivan, scholars praised the
decision, in the words of Alexander Meiklejohn, as “an occasion for
69
dancing in the streets.” Yet as courts struggled to apply the actual
malice standard, its theoretical and practical flaws were quickly
revealed. In the four decades after Sullivan, criticisms of the decision

62. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
63. See id. at 343, 347-48 (drawing a compromise between the state interest in
protecting the reputations of its citizens and the interest in protecting the press from
the dangers of a strict liability standard for defamation).
64. See id. at 345 (reasoning that an assumption of self-exposure to the media on
the part of public figures distinguishes public from private individuals in the
protections from defamation they are afforded).
65. Id. at 344.
66. Id. at 345.
67. Id. at 344. The Court failed, however, to address why the imperative of using
self-help should cut off all liability from public figures instead of merely mitigating
damages.
68. Id. at 352.
69. Kalven, supra note 43, at 221 n.125 (internal quotation omitted).
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have been both varied and pervasive. Indeed, most articles on libel
law call for its reformation, and many scholars have gone so far as to
71
advocate the wholesale elimination of the actual malice standard.
This Part will discuss three particular arguments against the actual
malice standard that underscore the need for reform. The first
argument is that the actual malice standard overprotects speech by
encouraging irresponsible media practices. The second argument is
that the standard, particularly as discussed in Gertz, underprotects the
reputations of plaintiffs. The final argument, and perhaps the most
common criticism of Sullivan, is that the standard underprotects
speech because it fails to shield the press from the tremendous cost
of litigating libel suits. These three criticisms, taken together, raise
serious concerns about the efficacy of the actual malice standard in
satisfying the First Amendment interests that compelled the Court in
Sullivan to protect defamatory speech.
A. The Actual Malice Standard Overprotects Speech
The actual malice standard necessarily implicates the issue of
journalistic responsibility by failing to penalize journalists who
negligently publish defamatory statements.
Given the Court’s
72
concern for the chilling effect of widely available damages and
73
especially considering the local biases that affected the case, it is
understandable that the Court in Sullivan refused to allow the Times
74
to be held liable for its negligent conduct. Nevertheless, in seeking
70. See discussion infra Part I.A.
71. Interestingly, two types of arguments call for overturning Sullivan: those that
claim that the First Amendment does not protect defamatory speech and those that
claim that it provides absolute protection for political speech by the press. Compare
Paul A. Lebel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation: An Accommodation of the Competing
Interests Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66 NEB. L. REV. 249, 287-97 (1987)
(arguing that the press can be adequately protected through non-constitutional
reformation of defamation law, and that the press should have absolute protection
for speech concerning the government), and Kalven, supra note 43, at 221 n.125
(agreeing with Alexander Meiklejohn’s characterization of the Sullivan decision as
cause for celebration because of increased protection of the press with regard to
political speech), with David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 487, 550 (1991) (concluding that the “present law of libel is a failure”), and
David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REV.
847, 847 (1986) (declaring that “[w]e face a libel crisis”), and Epstein, supra note 52,
at 783 (criticizing the characterization of the Sullivan decision as a cause for
celebration).
72. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (noting that the
judgment awarded was one thousand times greater than the maximum criminal
penalty).
73. See id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring) (mentioning that there was widespread
hostility toward desegregation in Montgomery, Alabama).
74. See id. at 264 (majority opinion) (reversing the $500,000 judgment against
the Times).
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to avoid that chilling effect, the Court freed the Times from any
liability for its negligent conduct, which included the newspaper’s
failure to fact-check the advertisement, contact any of its signatories,
or publish a timely retraction once it discovered that the
75
advertisement contained false statements.
Flawed as pre-Sullivan
libel law may have been, widely available damages in libel suits
provided journalists with a strong incentive to get the story right. By
looking solely to journalists’ states-of-mind, however, the only
incentive provided by the actual malice standard is that they report
with clean consciences, regardless of whether they act reasonably or
76
comply with professional norms.
In addition to the failure of Sullivan to deter negligent media
conduct, the actual malice standard specifically encourages certain
77
irresponsible practices.
The Sullivan standard provides reporters
with a strong disincentive from investigating news stories beyond the
minimum necessary. The more a reporter investigates, the more
likely it is that the reporter will discover some information that casts
the veracity of the story into doubt, which would increase the
78
likelihood of liability.
Simply failing to fully investigate a story,
75. See supra notes 22-28 (detailing the negligent conduct of the Times). Note,
however, that an incentive remains to publish truthful statements insofar as plaintiffs
will attempt to prove falsehood in order to recover damages. See Philip L. Judy, The
First Amendment Watchdog has a Flea Problem, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 541, 549 (1997)
(remarking that this burden of proof protects the media when it reports accurately).
Note also that plaintiffs may be able to indirectly hold media defendants liable for
negligent conduct by introducing evidence of such conduct as circumstantial
evidence. See generally Murchison, supra note 5, at 12 (mentioning that circumstantial
evidence of journalistic behavior may be used by plaintiffs to prove a reporter’s state
of mind).
76. One of the first sources of this criticism came neither from academic
scholarship nor from the United States. In 1991, the British Supreme Court
Procedure Committee considered whether England should adopt the actual malice
standard. In its report, the committee rejected Sullivan and rebuked American law
for overprotecting “irresponsible” media conduct. The report stated, “Standards of
care and accuracy in the press are, in our view, not such as to give any confidence
that a Sullivan defense would be treated responsibly. It would mean, in effect, that
newspapers could publish more or less what they like, provided they were honest.”
[BRITISH] SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE COMMITTEE REPORT ON PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE IN DEFAMATION 164–65 (1991); see Anderson, supra note 71, at 516
(“Under [Sullivan], constitutional protection turns not on what is published, or on
the objective truth or falsity of what is published, but on defendants’ knowledge or
doubts with respect to falsity.”).
77. See, e.g., William P. Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, The First
Amendment, and Bad Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 185 (“The actual malice
standard not only holds that there is no need to investigate; it suggests that it often is
better not to investigate.”); see also Judy, supra note 75, at 555 (“There is no better way
to avoid knowledge of the truth than to avoid investigation.”).
78. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 186 (observing that although
thoroughly investigated stories are most useful to the news-reading public, they are
also the riskiest because investigating thoroughly increases the risk that a paper will
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however, constitutes mere negligence for which the reporter cannot
79
be held liable. Similarly, editors are discouraged from extensively
reviewing stories, checking the facts contained in them or
recommending that a reporter conduct additional investigation, as
any of these actions may be seen by a jury as evidence that the editor
80
“entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication.”
Perhaps the most powerful incentive of irresponsible journalism
stems from the invasive discovery available to libel plaintiffs. For
81
example, the Supreme Court in Herbert v. Lando ruled that the
“thought processes” of reporters and editors are open to discovery in
82
83
defamation suits. Likewise, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court
allowed the admission of evidence obtained from a search into a
84
newspaper’s offices and files. These holdings discourage reporters
and editors from revealing their doubts as to the accuracy of a story
85
and generally encourage a lack of communication between them.
Moreover, the liberal discovery rules in libel suits deter reporters and
editors from keeping written records such as notes that can later be
86
used against them.
The actual malice standard encourages irresponsible journalistic
practices in two other important respects. While the media may be
held liable for repeating the defamatory statements of others, the
be found to have acted with actual malice); see also Judy, supra note 75, at 555–59
(noting that a reporter cannot be held liable for relying solely on one source, but the
reporter can be held liable for seeking out multiple sources, one of whom casts
serious doubts on the story’s veracity).
79. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974). (holding that a
reporter must act with a “high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity” to
establish reckless disregard for the truth).
80. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); see Judy, supra note 75, at
553–54 (describing the “no verification rule,” in which an editor and reporter refrain
from communicating with each other because they fear that such communication
will be used as evidence of actual malice).
81. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
82. See id. at 191-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It would be anomalous to turn
substantive liability on a journalist’s subjective attitude and at the same time to shield
from disclosure the most direct evidence of that attitude.”).
83. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
84. Id. at 563-67 (dismissing the argument that searches of newspaper offices for
evidence will seriously threaten the ability of the press to gather, analyze, and
disseminate news). Although that case concerned a police search for evidence in a
separate criminal case, Justice Stevens noted in dissent that the interests at stake in
Zurcher paralleled those in a defamation suit. Id. at 580-81 n.8 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
85. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 183–84 (arguing that sound journalism
is undermined when editors are discouraged from communicating with reporters
about their work product).
86. See Judy, supra note 75, at 554 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, allowing searches of reporters’ offices and files, prompted
reporters to avoid keeping written records).
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Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Pape held that the press cannot be
88
held liable for publishing false statements made by the government.
That rule, however, encourages the media to heavily rely on public
officials as sources, and provides no incentive to check information
89
provided by the government. Moreover, the actual malice standard
encourages the press to repeat news stories that have already
attracted the public’s attention. Because the individuals at the focus
of those stories are more likely to be deemed public figures, reporters
have greater assurance that the First Amendment will protect those
statements, whereas no similar guarantee exists in reporting a story
90
that has received little coverage elsewhere.
B. The Actual Malice Standard Underprotects Reputation
As noted in Part I, the Court in Gertz held that the actual malice
standard accommodates the reputational interests of public officials
91
and figures (“public plaintiffs”). First, Justice Powell argued that by
voluntarily entering public controversies or taking on public roles,
public plaintiffs know that they will face increased scrutiny and
92
therefore assume the risk of being defamed. Second, Justice Powell
argued that public plaintiffs can mitigate the reputational harm
inflicted upon them by using their publicity to engage in
93
94
counterspeech. Both claims, however, are severely flawed.

87. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
88. See id. at 292 (holding that a newspaper did not act with reckless disregard for
the truth when it omitted the word “alleged” from an article citing a government
report on police brutality); see also Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S.
6, 13-15 (1970) (holding that a newspaper was not liable for speech that accurately
reflected statements made at an official city council meeting).
89. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 189–92 (noting that the Pape rule
essentially allows the government to set the media’s news agenda). In his concurring
opinion in N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, Justice Black declared that “paramount
among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the
government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die
of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.” 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring). To the extent that the Supreme Court has encouraged the press to
cease examining government speech with a critical eye, the actual malice standard
promotes a breach of journalists’ central duty.
90. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 192–93 (suggesting that Supreme
Court jurisprudence may encourage reporters to “jump on the bandwagon and be
protected, [rather than] report on a new issue and risk liability”).
91. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974).
92. Id. at 344-45 (arguing that individuals must accept certain consequences of
their involvement in public affairs).
93. Id. at 344.
94. See, e.g., Judy, supra note 75, at 584 (questioning Justice Powell’s reasoning on
the grounds that a public plaintiff may not have assumed the risk of being defamed,
and also might lack the capability to adequately combat false statements).
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The actual malice standard forecloses nearly all access to damages
for public plaintiffs, yet public plaintiffs do not have equal access to
effective counterspeech, nor do they equally assume the risks
attendant to media scrutiny. For example, the extensive list of public
officials identified in post-Sullivan libel actions includes police
95
96
officers, professors at public universities, private nursing homes
97
98
licensed by states, and probation officers.
These individuals or
entities have less access to public counterspeech and assume the risk
of defamation to a reduced degree than major public officials like the
President or federal legislators. Nevertheless, the actual malice
99
standard treats them in exactly the same manner. Stated otherwise,
the problem is that the ability of public plaintiffs to anticipate and
mitigate reputational harm varies depending on the prominence of
the plaintiff, yet the actual malice standard almost entirely cuts off
liability to them as though their ability to do either was on equal
100
footing. Moreover, public officers such as policemen are no better
at foreseeing or redressing reputational harm than private citizens,
101
yet the latter group is far more likely to receive damages for libel.
Accordingly, public plaintiffs may not be able to issue
counterspeech that can reach the same audience—quantitatively or
qualitatively—as major media outlets. Sullivan is an apt example of
this problem. Because the Times was a prominent newspaper, to the
extent that the advertisement at the heart of the case actually
95. E.g., Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable, Inc., 780 F.2d 340, 342 (3d
Cir. 1985); McKinley v. Baden, 777 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1985).
96. See, e.g., Grossman v. Smart, 807 F. Supp. 1404, 1408 (C.D. Ill. 1992)
(granting summary judgment to the defendants because the two plaintiff professors
failed to show that the defendants acted with actual malice).
97. See, e.g., Doctor’s Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. E. Shore Newspapers, Inc., 244
N.E.2d 373, 377-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (ruling that the plaintiff’s nursing home was a
public official for the purposes of Sullivan analysis).
98. E.g., Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. 1991).
99. See, e.g., id. (requiring a public official plaintiff to prove actual malice).
100. In Gertz’s defense, Justice Powell recognized the disadvantages of creating a
broad standard as opposed to purely deciding libel cases on a case-by-case basis. The
Court upheld the actual malice standard, however, because a case-by-case evaluation
of defamation claims would lead to “unpredictable results and uncertain
expectations” and would hamstring the Court’s ability to supervise lower courts.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974). This argument is somewhat
unsatisfying, however. While the need for a broad standard is clear, the fact remains
that some plaintiffs deemed public officials have virtually no access to public
counterspeech, nor can it realistically be said that they invited media scrutiny.
However, note that this objection does not apply as easily to public figures. Because
their status as public figures turns in part on the extent to which they voluntarily
enter a public controversy, they should be able to foresee scrutiny concerning that
controversy and issue counterspeech to reporters seeking comment from them.
101. Cf. Judy, supra note 75, at 584 (positing that private figures, such as actors or
athletes do not necessarily assume the risk of defamation by rising to the top of their
professions).
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referred to Sullivan, its statements about him were published on a
wide stage. But because the Court recognized that the actual malice
102
standard does not require newspapers to retract false statements,
Sullivan’s ability to issue counterspeech on a national stage was
limited to the willingness of the Times or another prominent
newspaper to publish his reply. Absent that circumstance, Sullivan
could not resort to self-help. Moreover, as a county commissioner,
Sullivan assumed the risk of defamation at most from the local press.
It is far less tenable that he also assumed the risk of being defamed in
the national press.
A further problem is that the Internet has provided avenues of
communication that can reach considerably larger audiences than
103
those available when Gertz was decided.
Sullivan and Gertz were
concerned with a world where only an exclusive few newspapers or
104
broadcasters could publish information broadly to the public.
Today, however, the media has expanded to include web logs
(“blogs”), online news and opinion publications, and message
105
boards.
The potential damage inflicted by defamatory Internet
speech is substantially magnified, as Internet publications are open to
a global audience and available for a longer, sometimes permanent
106
duration. Whereas only 394 copies of the Times were circulated in
Alabama at the time of Sullivan, access to Times articles is now solely
limited by an individual’s ability to use a computer or get to a
107
newsstand.
The prevalence of Internet speech undermines the viability of
Justice Powell’s claims. It is arguable that a public officer invites the
scrutiny of traditional news outlets, which are run by professional
journalists and are businesses that prize their reputations for
102. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286-87 (1964).
103. See, e.g., Miniwatts Marketing Group, World Internet Usage Statistics News
and Population Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (reporting that
almost 1.2 billion people have access to the internet) (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
104. See Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New
Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 833, 848–54 (2006) (arguing that the
Court in Sullivan and Gertz was concerned with a “one-to-many” media archetype, but
that the Internet has shifted the media archetype to a “many-to-many” model).
105. See id. (noting that today the average citizen enjoys a potential global
audience on the Internet through the use of web sites, blogs, and Usenets).
106. A recent article in The Washington Post aptly highlighted this problem.
According to the article, law students’ summer jobs are put at risk because of the
availability of postings on an online message board notorious for spreading malicious
rumors. See Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web, WASH. POST, Mar. 7,
2007, at A1 (reporting that gossip about law students was posted on Internet chat
threads, which became widely accessible though Google searches).
107. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 260 n.3 (noting that total circulation for the Times
that day was 650,000).
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108

accuracy. However, most public officers do not assume the risk of
being defamed by an anonymous blogger or in a message board
posting. More importantly, the expansion of outlets for mass
communication has diluted the effectiveness of public plaintiffs’
109
counterspeech. While a large portion of the media is likely to cover
statements made by a public plaintiff of major prominence, such as a
senator or movie star, counterspeech made by many, if not most,
other public plaintiffs will reach a smaller and less concentrated
110
audience.
In response to the problem of unequal access to counterspeech, it
has been suggested that the Court replace the public plaintiff
categories with one that turns on a plaintiff’s “relative access” to
111
counterspeech.
However, this response does not resolve a further
problem with Justice Powell’s arguments, which he briefly discussed
in Gertz: that “an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo
[the] harm of defamatory falsehood” because “the truth rarely
112
catches up with a lie.”
That is, once a defamatory statement has
been published, the defamed individual is immediately placed in a
defensive posture and is therefore at a disadvantage in curing the
113
reputational harm.
108. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974) (“An
individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary
consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public
scrutiny than might otherwise be the case.”), with Judy, supra note 75, at 584
(questioning whether private citizens who achieve the status of public figures truly
assume the risk associated with their fame).
109. See Owen Fiss, In Search of a New Paradigm, 104 YALE L.J. 1613, 1614–15 (1995)
(arguing that the expansion of the media requires the Court to consider the
implications of the “technological revolution” on the First Amendment);
Perzanowski, supra note 104, at 853 (discussing the effect of the Internet in
disbursing publications to a more scattered audience).
110. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (questioning whether news
outlets give “[d]enials, retractions, and corrections” enough prominence to
counteract the harm inflicted by the original story).
111. See Perzanowski, supra note 104, at 860–71 (advocating that courts should
only apply the actual malice standard where the plaintiff’s access to corrective
counterspeech is sufficient to protect their reputational interests).
112. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9 (majority opinion).
113. This argument was eloquently made by Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1971):
[I]t is the rare case where the denial overtakes the original charge. Denials,
retractions and corrections are not “hot” news, and rarely receive the
prominence of the original story. When the public official or public figure is
a minor functionary, or has left the position that put him in the public
eye . . . the argument loses all of its force. In the vast majority of libels
involving public officials or public figures, the ability to respond through the
media will depend on the same complex factor on which the ability of a
private individual depends: the unpredictable event of the media’s
continuing interest in the story. Thus the unproved, and highly improbable,
generalization that an as yet undefined class of “public figures” involved in
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Despite recognizing this problem, Justice Powell asserted that the
availability of counterspeech satisfies the public plaintiff’s
reputational interest regardless of the adequacy of the
114
counterspeech.
This response is unsatisfying. Justice Powell
premised the public/private distinction in large part on public
plaintiffs’ ability to mitigate reputational harm through
115
counterspeech.
Yet almost immediately thereafter, he recognized
116
that counterspeech is “seldom” effective in achieving that very end.
In other words, his argument is that a public plaintiff’s reputation
does not warrant special protection because that plaintiff can resort
to self-help that is almost always inadequate.
In arguing that counterspeech is constitutionally sufficient
regardless of its potency, Justice Powell implied that ineffective
counterspeech is an inevitable consequence of any rule that protects
press speech. There are, however, two scenarios in which a public
plaintiff’s counterspeech can be considerably more effective in
rebutting false statements than the counterspeech envisioned by
Justice Powell. First, counterspeech can be contemporaneous with
the defamatory utterance when reporters seek and publish responses
from would-be plaintiffs. Second, where the press retracts false
statements, the public counterspeech comes not from the plaintiff,
but from a more reliable speaker—the source of the false statement.
A retraction is also more likely to reach the same audience as the
defamatory statement, as a public plaintiff’s counterspeech would
otherwise be made in a different outlet with a different audience.
Consequently, counterspeech would be bolstered by a rule requiring
or encouraging the press to publish concurrent responses and
subsequent retractions.
C. The Actual Malice Standard Underprotects Speech
The third criticism of the actual malice standard, which is made
throughout much of the literature on libel law, is that the standard
117
fails to shield the press from the chilling effect feared by the Court.
matters of public concern will be better able to respond through the media
than private individuals also involved in such matters seems too insubstantial
a reed on which to rest a constitutional distinction.
114. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9 (“But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal,
standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to our
inquiry.”).
115. Id. at 344.
116. Id. at 344 n.9.
117. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 71, at 514 (noting that plaintiffs are likely to
ask for, and juries are likely to award, punitive damages in defamation cases); Barrett,
supra note 71, at 856 (“Juries may well perceive . . . that they are charged with
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Ironically, Sullivan had the effect of substantially increasing the cost
of litigating libel cases by expanding the scope of discovery needed by
118
The Sullivan standard turns on the defendant’s state-ofplaintiffs.
mind, thus requiring plaintiffs to inquire into the defendants’
119
editorial processes and to seek internal documents.
Under a
standard that merely turns on the falsity of a published statement,
information about the internal conduct of a media defendant would
be largely irrelevant.
Additionally, plaintiffs who are successful in libel litigation often
receive tremendous damages awards, which in many cases total in the
120
millions. Although damages are often reduced following trial, the
121
The magnitude of jury awards for
press bears the costs of appeal.
libel has sparked a dramatic spike in litigation costs faced by the
press. The size of awards compels other would-be plaintiffs to bring
122
lawsuits because of the prospects of receiving favorable settlements.
That escalation of lawsuits, combined with the prospect of incurring
tremendous liability and litigation costs, in turn spurs the press to

judging the media’s responsibility. Libel juries, no longer merely providing
recompense to the plaintiff, are imposing punishment for the defendant’s
irresponsible conduct.”).
118. See Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York Times “Actual
Malice” Standard Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153, 115455 (1993) (arguing that the actual malice standard encourages plaintiffs to seek
costly discovery because discovery is the only way to determine whether a defendant
acted recklessly or knowingly).
119. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979) (holding that plaintiffs can
use discovery to inquire into the editorial process); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 1:26 (2d ed. 2006) (theorizing that the actual malice standard’s true
effect was to invite greater public scrutiny upon the press’ practices).
120. See Anderson, supra note 71, at 514 n.130 (providing examples of multimillion dollar awards that have been handed down by juries); Weaver & Bennett,
supra note 118, at 1153-54 (noting that there were “virtually no recoveries” in libel
suits following Sullivan, yet the number of libel suits grew in the years that followed it
and plaintiffs eventually won massive awards); see also Barrett, supra note 71, at 865–
67 (attributing the large damages to incommensurability between monetary damages
and psychic, reputational harm).
121. See Weaver & Bennett, supra note 118, at 1181 (remarking that most libel
defendants lost at trial but eventually win after a costly appeal). Moreover, the
availability of remittitur does not undo the hefty costs of providing discovery. See
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774 (1985) (White,
J., concurring) (remarking that regardless of the scope of awards won by successful
plaintiffs, media defendants must bear the cost of providing pre-trial discovery).
122. See Smolla, supra note 4, at 7 (“The prospect of such lucrative awards is likely
to entice more potential defamation plaintiffs to bring suit despite the fact that their
claims do not meet the legal standards that appellate courts are struggling to
impose.”). Smolla attributes the rise in huge awards to a cultural desire to protect
mental well-being. Id. at 17.
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seek preventative legal advice, insurance, and more expensive legal
123
services.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO PROMOTE A RESPONSIBLE
PRESS
At the crux of Gertz is the notion that Sullivan balanced two
competing interests: the state’s interest in protecting reputation and
124
the constitutional interest in avoiding a chilling effect on the press.
Yet the creation of the actual malice standard, as opposed to the
absolute protection standard advocated by the concurring justices in
125
Sullivan, reveals that a third interest was also at play in the decision.
After all, a standard constructed to satisfy only the two interests
discussed in Gertz would appear similar to the protection advocated in
126
the Sullivan concurrences.
Under the standard advocated in the
concurrences, there would be absolute protection for the press, but
that protection would be limited to suits brought by public plaintiffs,
whose reputational injuries are mitigated by counterspeech and
waived by the assumption of risk tied to attaining public
127
prominence.

123. See Ronald A. Cass, Principle and Interest in Libel Law After New York Times: An
Incentive Analysis, in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 103
(Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989) (arguing that these litigation costs
“consume a large portion of the savings conferred by the more press-protective
rule”); see also Epstein, supra note 52, at 145 (arguing that legal expenses increase the
uncertainty of libel litigation, thereby making newspapers more risk averse in
reporting).
124. See supra note 63 (mentioning that the Court accommodated both interests
by limiting the protection of the press to statements made about public officials).
125. See supra notes 65-68 (explaining the Gertz Court’s rationale for imposing the
actual malice standard).
126. Based solely on the Court’s discussion of the importance of political speech
in Sullivan, it certainly seemed that such protection would be granted. After
discussing the importance of political speech generally, the Court stated, “If neither
factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield
from criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two elements is no less
inadequate.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964). The Court did
not explain why the constitutional limitation on defamation liability extends solely to
intentional or reckless defamatory statements.
127. Ironically, the Court in Gertz recognized that a constitutional protection of
press speech, standing alone, would be absolute:
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, however, not the
only societal value at issue. If it were, this Court would have embraced long
ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. Such a rule would,
indeed, obviate the fear that the prospect of civil liability for injurious
falsehood might dissuade a timorous press from the effective exercise of First
Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for the communications
media requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of
defamation.
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Instead of providing this protection, the Court also refused to
protect intentional or reckless publications of false statements.
However, neither the interest in avoiding a chilling effect on the
press nor the interest in protecting plaintiffs’ reputations justifies or
requires that limitation. The remaining conclusion is that Sullivan
was also grounded on the third supposition that the First
Amendment does not protect the press when it intentionally or
128
recklessly lies to the public.
In sum, the Court in Sullivan was
concerned with balancing three interests: (1) the need to protect
plaintiffs’ reputations (a compelling interest held by the state),
(2) the need to protect the press’s speech (an interest spawned from
the Constitution), and (3) the need to ensure that the press is
129
honest.
Essentially, the Court in Sullivan engaged in quality control of
political speech in creating the actual malice standard. The Court
did not explain whether this limitation stemmed from prudential or
constitutional grounds. It is conceivable that the Court merely
balked at protecting an individual who lies, even when the lies
concern political matters at the “core” of First Amendment
protection. Alternatively, the Court may have created the actual
malice standard under the tacit belief that an honest press facilitates
a broad-based discussion of important matters, and that the
Constitution therefore does not protect falsehoods that are
intentionally or recklessly published.
The remaining issues, then, are the source and breadth of the
interest in an honest press, to the extent that such an interest exists at
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (internal citations omitted).
The Court, however, did not notice the gaping hole in this claim: where the
limitation of press liability to statements made with actual malice fit into its scheme
of bilateral competing interests.
128. It might be argued that a second possible conclusion is that the state has a
legitimate interest in protecting every plaintiff, public or not, from falsehoods
uttered with actual malice. The arguments in Gertz, however, apply just as much to
false statements that are uttered with actual malice as to those that are negligently
uttered. First, the impact of public counterspeech in alleviating reputational injury
does not turn on the speaker’s motive or intent. Second, there is no reason to
believe that a public plaintiff does not also assume the risk of bearing the brunt of
malicious lies in addition to mistaken falsehoods.
129. In his plurality opinion in Curtis, Justice Harlan recognized that Sullivan was
moved by this third interest:
[T]o take the rule found appropriate in New York Times to resolve the
‘tension’ between the particular constitutional interest there involved and
the interests of personal reputation and press responsibility . . . would be to
attribute to this aspect of New York Times an unintended inexorability at the
threshold of this new constitutional development.
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967) (plurality opinion) (internal
citation omitted).
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130

all.
It stands to reason that because Sullivan and Gertz did not
discuss that interest, examining it may expose the need for a new
standard to govern the constitutional regime of libel law. The
argument of this Part is that the interest in an honest press is derived
from the Constitution, and that the First Amendment requires a
standard that deters negligent media conduct. To reach that
conclusion, it is necessary to examine the interplay between the press
and the interests that serve as the cornerstone of the First
Amendment.
A. The Relationship Between the First Amendment and the Press
Although scholars have identified multiple interests that underlie
the First Amendment, two have surfaced most frequently throughout
the Court’s free speech jurisprudence: the interest in advancing
democracy-enhancing speech and the interest in promoting the
131
marketplace of ideas. Both interests are social insofar as they focus
on the role of speech in promoting some collective good, be it the
132
assurance of an effective government or the ascertainment of truth.
The press uniquely furthers both interests by disseminating
information and by providing a forum for public debate. The press is
also capable of devoting time, resources, and reporting experience

130. Of course, it is also possible that the third interest does not actually exist,
such that the Court was wrong in turning the protection on the speaker’s state-ofmind in the first place. If it does not, the semi-absolute protection discussed above
would be warranted, and the press would be absolutely protected when speaking
about a public plaintiff. The discussion of the press’s role in facilitating the
fundamental First Amendment interests, however, reveals that there is in fact an
interest in an honest press.
131. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 878-89 (1963) (advocating that the freedom of expression is necessary
to: (1) assure individual self-fulfillment, (2) attain the truth, (3) secure participation
by society in the political process, and (4) maintain the balance between stability and
change in society).
132. Another interest frequently discussed throughout First Amendment literature
is that free speech maximizes individual self-fulfillment. That is, by debating and
discussing ideas, people are more capable of forming their normative beliefs and
acquiring knowledge. See Emerson, supra note 131, at 879-81 (arguing that every
person has the right to form and express their own beliefs and opinions); Martin H.
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594-95 (1982) (arguing that
the interest in self-realization is the primary interest underlying the First
Amendment). While this interest has received a great deal of attention from
scholars, it has played a relatively minor role in discussions of the freedom of the
press or of defamation generally. Because the primary role of the press is to facilitate
debate and the dissemination of ideas among the masses, it has a more substantial
effect on the social interests of the First Amendment (i.e., the marketplace of ideas
and democratic speech interests) than the private interest of self-fulfillment.
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toward the investigation of stories, thereby enabling it to provide
133
information that most individuals cannot acquire alone.
1.

Democracy-enhancing speech and the marketplace of ideas
Sullivan was largely premised on the view that the Constitution
protects free speech “to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
134
people.” Justice Brandeis famously expressed this view of the First
Amendment as fostering the dissemination of political speech in his
135
oft-cited concurrence in Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that
in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the
arbitrary . . . . They believed that freedom to think as you will and
to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth . . . . Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced
by law—the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
136
guaranteed.

Consequently, free speech is not an end in itself but rather a means
toward advancing self-governance by fostering individual political
137
When free speech is protected, individuals can
decision-making.
acquire the information necessary to develop their political notions.
Conversely, individuals are also free to communicate their views to
138
others and to seek to persuade them.
By allowing for widespread debate, speech cultivates the
development of social consensus on political matters and the
139
formation of groups with common political goals.
In this sense,
133. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 170 (discussing the importance of
news investigation and reporting for the furtherance of First Amendment interests).
134. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
135. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
136. Id. at 375–76, cited in Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
137. See Heather Maly, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don’t Publish at All: Forum
Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment Un-Guaranteed, 14 J.L. &
POL’Y 883, 889 (2006) (“Free speech is respected as a necessity to democratic selfgovernment and is prized for its protection of the free exchange of ideas.”).
138. See Emerson, supra note 131, at 882–84 (noting that freedom of
communication is essential to democratic governments because it allows constituents
to voice their opinions to their elected representatives).
139. See id. at 882-84 (describing how the freedom of expression allows people to
participate in democratic decision-making through a process of open
communication available to all members of the community).
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political parties are a product of a society that tolerates speech, as
they require unfettered ability to advance platforms. Speech also
allows individuals to directly communicate their views and needs to
the government. Demonstrations, letters to congressmen and op-eds
in newspapers provide the public with access to the ears of their
140
representatives and thereby shape government action.
The Court has also long recognized a second interest underlying
the First Amendment: that a debate free of governmental restraint is
necessary for the ascertainment of truth.
Justice Holmes
encapsulated this notion in his metaphor of the marketplace of ideas:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundation of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
141
of the market . . . .

Underlying this interest is a conception of truth as relativistic or at
least as difficult to pin down, such that no official or individual can
142
serve as sole arbiter of accepted fact. Thus, as with the interest in
democracy-enhancing speech, free expression is once again viewed as
a process for the attainment of a social good. Here, that social good
is the development of a general canon of truth.
2.

The role of a responsible press in facilitating First Amendment interests
i.

Democracy-enhancing speech

The press plays a key role in effectuating the fundamental First
Amendment interests of promoting democracy-enhancing speech
and the marketplace of ideas. As noted, both interests are social in
nature and, therefore, require mass communication and a common
source of information from which political views can be developed
143
and truth can be ascertained.
Moreover, to use Alexander
Meiklejohn’s metaphor, the press serves as a kind of town hall in
140. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). (declaring that the
information provided by the press enables citizens to vote intelligently and form wellreasoned opinions on the administration of government).
141. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
142. Judge Learned Hand eloquently made this point: “[Free expression]
presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude
of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.” United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
143. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 131, at 883 (advocating that every democracy
“must have some process for feeding back to it information concerning the attitudes,
needs and wishes of its citizens”).
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144

which political debate can occur. Both the Court and the Framers
have extensively noted the unique service provided by the press in
supplying a forum for public debate and facilitating communication
145
between citizens and government.
The press also creates democracy-enhancing speech when it
reports on political affairs. As far back as the founding of the United
States, the press has been viewed as a watchdog of the government,
charged with ensuring that politicians do not abuse their power and
146
Vincent Blasi
that government runs efficiently and effectively.
famously argued that the First Amendment protects free expression
to ensure that the public retains a “checking power” on the
147
government’s exercise of authority.
Because of its independence
from government and its ability to investigate stories and quickly
spread information, the press retains a near monopoly on the
148
checking power.
Private individuals seeking to expose corruption
turn to the press to get the story out, and reporters frequently
investigate other public and private malfeasance. Accordingly, in
149
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, the Court declared that
“[t]he daily newspaper . . . [is] essential to the effective functioning
144. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
OF THE PEOPLE 26–27 (1960).

POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS

145. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667-68 (1990)
(commenting on the “unique role” of the press in informing and educating the
public and providing a public forum for debate); Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v.
Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1983) (examining the important
role served by the press during the American Revolution); Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S.
at 491-92 (discussing the role of the press in communicating with the government to
provide full and accurate information to the public); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
383 (1947) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“A free press lies at the heart of our democracy
and its preservation is essential to the survival of liberty.”); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“A free press is
indispensable to the workings of our democratic society.”); Letter from James
Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103, 103
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (“A popular Government, without popular information, or
the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both.”); Thomas Jefferson, Democracy 150-51 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1939), quoted in
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 208 n.6 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur liberty
depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being
lost.”).
146. See supra Part III.A (explaining how the press’ role in bringing information to
the public allows the public to engage in more efficient political decision-making);
see also C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 348–50
(1998) (noting the watchdog role of the press is based on the idea that providing
information to the public to facilitate self-governance promotes wise decision-making
from elected leaders).
147. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 534–35 (1977).
148. See id. at 601–03 (explaining the unique importance of newsgathering and
investigation in maintaining a checking power).
149. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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of our political system” because it seeks to “vigilantly scrutiniz[e] the
official conduct of those who administer the state” and serves “as a
150
potent check on arbitrary action or abuse.” In addition to its role
in reporting on political corruption, the press bolsters the
effectiveness of government by ensuring that politicians exercise
good and informed judgment, act in good faith, and are capable of
151
fulfilling their representative duties.
Because it scrutinizes political activity and promotes good
governance, the press has long been viewed as holding a special place
within the constitutional framework. This view of the press is
encapsulated in its traditional epithet as the “Fourth Estate” or
“fourth branch of government” that provides a check upon the
152
government at all levels.
The Court has ascribed to the view that
the Framers intended the press to oversee the entirety of
153
government. Writing for the Court in Mills v. Alabama, Justice
Black argued:
The Constitution specifically selected the press . . . to play an
important role in the discussion of public affairs . . . . [T]he press
serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally
chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people
154
responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.”

The press therefore has a “constitutionally designated” duty to spread
155
As Justice Potter Stewart argued, the
information to the public.
Framers consequently intended the press to hold a privileged role
156
within the First Amendment scheme.

150. Id. at 602.
151. See Emerson, supra note 131, at 882–84 (asserting that freedom of the press is
not simply beneficial to the political process, but rather is a crucial component of a
successful democracy).
152. See Amanda S. Reid & Laurence B. Alexander, A Test Case for Newsgathering:
The Effects of September 11, 2001 on the Changing Watchdog Role of the Press, 25 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 357, 360 (2005) (“The traditional watchdog role of the press developed
the Fourth Estate function, where the press served as a check on the three branches
of government.”); Justice Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” Address at the Yale Law
School Sesquicentennial Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974), in 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634
(1975) (opining that just as the primary purpose of establishing three branches of
the federal government was to promote checks and balances, the guaranteeing
freedom of the press was a means of preventing autocracy).
153. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
154. Id. at 219 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
155. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 571-72 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that unannounced police searches of a student newspaper
violated the constitutional protections given to the press).
156. See Stewart, supra note 152, at 634 (“The primary purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of a free press was . . . to create a fourth institution outside
the Government as an additional check on the three official branches.”).
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This view of the press as an independent, quasi-constitutional
entity—or at least one necessary for the free flow of democracyenhancing speech—sheds light on the relationship of the
government and press in facilitating constitutional interests. Cass
Sunstein argued that the First Amendment, although framed as a
157
Professor Sunstein
negative right, in fact has positive elements.
used the example of the hostile audience scenario, wherein the
government is obligated to restrain a hostile audience to ensure that
158
a speaker can communicate its message.
In this respect, the First
Amendment contains a normative component: it does not merely
proscribe the government from restraining speech, but it seeks to
159
maximize speech and even requires that speech be subsidized. To
the extent that the press serves as a unique facilitator of the spread of
democratic ideas and political debate, it is necessary for the
fulfillment of the positive vision of the First Amendment recognized
by Professor Sunstein. That is, the Framers saw the protection of free
expression as a means of maximizing democracy-enhancing speech
160
and the press as integral to the fruition of that vision.
Because the press has a monopoly on speech impacting one of the
core concerns of the First Amendment, it is imperative that reporters
and editors responsibly exercise that power. Following Sullivan, the
Court solely approached defamation litigation as though it were an
indirect form of seditious libel, through which private individuals
161
could impose a chilling effect on press speech. However, the Court
has not taken the inverse perspective and focused on the ways that
162
press coverage can impact good governance and political discourse.
Simply put, when the press spreads false information—negligently or
157. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 273–74 (1992)
(asserting that while the First Amendment is framed as protecting citizens from
government incursions, it also includes government obligations to provide certain
services to citizens as well).
158. See id. (explaining that the governmental protection from physical harm at
the hands of an angered audience represents a positive element to the right to free
speech).
159. See id. at 274 (arguing that libel requires public plaintiffs to sacrifice their
reputations as a subsidy for a free press).
160. See Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 170 (observing the that First
Amendment’s goals of promoting self-government and checking the state’s power
are dependent upon a news media that addresses issues of public importance).
161. See Blasi, supra note 147, at 574–78 (arguing that the Supreme Court sought
to prevent a chilling effect on the checking power of the press in the line of
defamation cases in the decade following Sullivan); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (comparing the imposition of defamation liability to the
Sedition Act of 1798).
162. See Blasi, supra note 147, at 574-75 (positing that the key concept of the
Sullivan decision was the analogy to the crime of seditious libel, not selfgovernment).
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intentionally—it inhibits the public’s ability to make informed
political choices. Moreover, because the press has the virtually
exclusive ability to oversee the entirety of the government, an
irresponsible press fails to fulfill its role as the sole independent
watchdog of the government.
If we push the metaphor of the press as the fourth branch of
government to its literal end and take seriously the magnitude of the
press’s importance in facilitating the democratic process, then as with
any governmental body, the power of the press should be subject to
its own checks. It is understandable that the Court is hesitant to allow
any such oversight. If the government regulated the press, then it
might abuse that authority and seek to limit the press’s checking
163
power. If private individuals can indirectly check the press through
defamation suits, then the Court’s fear of a self-imposed chilling
164
effect could be realized. Yet regardless of whether any specific form
of regulation is desirable, the point remains that a press that lies to
the public or negligently publishes falsehoods vitiates its role in
facilitating democracy-enhancing speech and thereby harms the
165
populace’s ability to effectively govern itself.
Thus, to the extent
that it is feasible, the implementation of a regulatory scheme or
constitutional standard that maximizes the truth-telling of the press
and avoids sacrificing the press’s independence would best serve the
democracy-enhancing ends of the First Amendment.
ii. The marketplace of ideas
The metaphor of the marketplace of ideas is just as apt in
illustrating the importance of a responsible press. Owen Fiss argued
that economic theory concerning the marketplace of goods is
applicable to First Amendment theory concerning the marketplace of

163. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1, 56 (“If courts permit reformers to alter the first amendment’s traditional role as a
limitation on governmental authority so as to authorize affirmative government
action to apportion access rights to the marketplace, the judiciary unwittingly may
create a massive censorship system masquerading as marketplace reform.”).
164. See Judy, supra note 75, at 562-63 (providing conflicting evidence as to
whether libel suits affect the media’s conduct); see also Weaver & Bennett, supra note
118, at 1189-90 (noting that editors consult defamation attorneys and alter articles
because of liability concerns, but concluding that this chilling effect is minimal, and
may even be beneficial).
165. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 400 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting) (“It is not at all inconceivable that virtually unrestrained defamatory
remarks about private citizens will discourage them from speaking out and
concerning themselves with social problems. This would turn the First Amendment
on its head.”).
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166

ideas. Just as the government must create economic regulations to
prevent market failures, failures of the media can be ameliorated
167
Professor Fiss pointed to two
through government intervention.
failures of the media as evidence of the need for such regulation.
First, he argued that the media privileges select groups over others
and thus does not provide equal access to or equal coverage of
168
information.
Second, Professor Fiss argued that the media seeks
profit rather than the furtherance of the marketplace of ideas, and it
therefore might provide false information or information that does
169
not facilitate the truth-seeking end of the First Amendment.
Negligent or intentionally false reporting constitutes a third market
failure: the public cannot succeed in ascertaining truth if its
discourse rests upon false premises. Moreover, if the press has free
reign to spread falsehoods or to negligently report, the public may
lose confidence in the integrity of the conclusions derived from the
170
marketplace of ideas. Thus, any constitutional standard that allows
the press to negligently or intentionally spread false information
hampers the First Amendment goal of fostering a truth-seeking
public interchange of conjecture and debate.

166. See Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-88 (1987) (arguing
that the market constrains the presentation of matters of public interest in two ways:
(1) the market privileges select groups by making programs responsive to their
needs, and (2) the market incentivizes editorial and programming decisions that may
be based more on profitability than on the public’s needs). Professor Fiss made this
point in response to an article by Professor Coase. In that article, Professor Coase
made the opposing argument that the laissez faire view of the marketplace of ideas
should be applied to economic markets. See R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the
Market for Ideas, 64 AM. EC. REV. 384 (1974) (arguing that in the market for ideas,
government regulation is undesirable and should be strictly limited).
167. See Fiss, supra note 166, at 787 (pointing out that “competition among
[media] institutions is far from perfect, and some might argue for state intervention
on a theory of market failure”); see also Ingber, supra note 163, at 5 (positing that
market failures might need to be cured by state intervention).
168. Fiss, supra note 166, at 787–88.
169. Id. at 788 (“[T]here is no necessary, or even probabilistic, relationship
between making a profit . . . and supplying the electorate with the information they
need to make free and intelligent choices . . . .”). An apt example of this problem
arose following the Columbine shootings, when there was an increased call for
scrutiny of depictions of violence in the media. To the extent that those depictions
are socially harmful and of little value in ascertaining truth, they may be deemed a
substantial market failure. See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, Current Proposals for Media
Accountability in Light of the First Amendment, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH 269 (Ellen Frankel
Paul et al. eds., 2004).
170. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (remarking that untrue,
defamatory statements made by the press may discourage citizens from participating
in government decision-making).
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The notion that an unencumbered marketplace of ideas leads to
171
the discovery of truth is founded on the premise that the process of
freely discussing ideas is the best available means of discovering truth.
However, there is no reason to believe that a completely open forum
172
of discussion is better than any other means of ascertaining truth.
An alternative process that maximizes truth-telling by the press would
better facilitate the marketplace of ideas by ensuring to the greatest
extent possible that it is not corrupted by lies or negligent falsehoods.
Even if it is impossible to know the truth of a proposition, it is
possible to identify regulations of speech that reduce the intentional
or negligent spread of falsehoods. When a newspaper lies, we know
that the marketplace of ideas is tainted with a falsehood. Just the
same, when a newspaper acts negligently in reporting a story, we
know that it is more likely that the marketplace is similarly tainted. A
constitutional standard that reduced media negligence would
consequently bolster the public’s ability to ascertain truth and
thereby facilitate the constitutional interest in maintaining an
otherwise free marketplace of ideas. In this respect, it is possible to
optimize the process by which the marketplace of ideas functions
173
while remaining neutral to its contents.
B. The Need to Reform the Actual Malice Standard
Unlike other tort actions, the interests at stake in libel suits are not
174
bilateral.
That is, they are not limited to the reputation of the
171. See Emerson, supra note 131, at 882 (“Since facts are discovered and opinions
formed only by the individual, the system demands that all persons participate.”).
172. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 19–29 (1982)
(questioning whether knowledge is more likely to be gained in a society in which
views are freely expressed); see also LEE BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 133–45
(1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court should move away from its hands-off
attitude toward modern mass media).
173. Justice Harlan expounded upon this view in his plurality opinion in Curtis:
Impositions based on misconduct can be neutral with respect to content of
the speech involved, free of historical taint, and adjusted to strike a fair
balance between the interests of the community in free circulation of
information and those of individuals in seeking recompense for harm done
by the circulation of defamatory falsehood.
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (plurality opinion).
The notion that the marketplace of ideas can be “improved” through regulations
of the press is not a new one. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 38990 (1969) (upholding the FCC imposition of a “fairness doctrine” on broadcasted
statements that bear on a controversial issue or matter of public importance because
broadcast waves are a limited resource and the First Amendment does not prohibit
the government from requiring broadcasters to act as public trustees). See generally
CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY & THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993) (approving of
regulations of the media for the purpose of improving the marketplace of ideas).
174. See Sunstein, supra note 157, at 269–70 (stating that the interests at stake in
defamation suits are both private and public ones).
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plaintiff and the potential chilling effect on the defendant. Rather,
the public has an interest in a press that does not merely report in
good faith, but which also comports to a standard of conduct that
175
maximizes truth-telling in news reports.
Sullivan concluded that
the First Amendment interest in democracy-enhancing speech is
compromised when the Court underprotects the media, as plaintiffs
176
could indirectly chill the speech of media defendants.
Just the
same, however, that interest is compromised when the Court
overprotects media speech and shields the press from any liability for
177
negligent conduct.
When the press is overprotected, it is more
likely to engage in irresponsible conduct, and as noted, to impede
democracy-enhancing and truth-seeking speech. What is needed,
then, is not a glut of protection but a new standard that at once
accommodates the interests in avoiding a chilling effect and in
maximizing media truth-telling, as well as in protecting plaintiffs’
reputations.
Thus, the Court must amend the actual malice standard to require
or encourage responsible journalistic practices. As argued above, the
interest in a responsible press is constitutional, or it is at least
necessary for the fulfillment of other fundamental constitutional
178
interests.
This is not a novel claim—its roots extend to numerous
First Amendment decisions and the writings of many of the
179
Framers.
Because the Supreme Court is the primary arbiter of
180
constitutional meaning and dictates, it is the obligation of the
Court to create a new standard that eliminates the perverse incentives
spurred by the actual malice standard.

175. See Ingber, supra note 163, at 4 (arguing that free expression provides
aggregate benefits to society).
176. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278–79 (1964).
177. This point is aptly made in one of the only articles to discuss the
overprotection of the actual malice standard:
[T]he way in which journalism is practiced has significant implications for
First Amendment theory. The viability of the First Amendment’s goals of
fostering self-governance and checking the power of the state, for example,
depends upon the existence of a news media that is engaged in serious
coverage and investigation of issues of public import. Therefore, the extent
to which the Court creates incentives and disincentives for journalists to act
in furtherance of these goals is of considerable First Amendment interest.
Marshall & Gilles, supra note 77, at 169–70.
178. See supra Part III (arguing that a responsible press fulfills the constitutional
interests of promoting democracy-enhancing speech and sustaining a marketplace of
ideas).
179. See supra Parts I.A, III.B.
180. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 18–19 (4th ed. 2003)
(discussing three views regarding the Supreme Court’s authority to interpret the
Constitution).
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One might argue that the interest in a responsible press is a state
interest rather than a constitutional interest, such that the Court
should leave regulation of the press to state legislatures. The obvious
objection to that claim is that handing regulatory power over the
press to state legislatures would allow governments to directly chill
press speech. Additionally, even if legislatures could be trusted to
regulate the press, the constitutional standard created by the Court in
Sullivan would continue to generate the perverse incentives that
181
defeat the purported state interest.
The actual malice standard
would therefore obstruct states’ ability to act upon their interest in
promoting responsible media conduct, if such an interest exists.
Absent a constitutional amendment, the Court is the only body
182
capable of reforming the actual malice standard. Thus, even if the
interest in a responsible press is not held by the states, it is incumbent
upon the Court to either fashion a new standard that does not
generate perverse incentives, or to allow the states to fashion their
183
own standard.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF A SUMMARY PROCEEDING THAT
PROMOTES MEDIA RESPONSIBILITY, REMEDIES REPUTATIONAL HARM,
AND REDUCES LITIGATION COSTS
Gertz implied that the constitutional standard governing libel law
should accommodate all the interests at stake in defamation suits.
Ironically, Sullivan failed to sufficiently accommodate any of them.
181. See supra Part II.A.
182. Professor Anderson argued that the Sullivan standard has so permeated the
regime of libel law that any political constituency for statutory reform has been
effectively crowded out by the Supreme Court.
[The Court] has created not merely a few constitutional limitations on state
tort rules, but a matrix of substantive principles, evidentiary rules, and de
facto innovations in judge-jury roles and other procedural matters. These
are all constitutionally based and can only be changed by those who have the
power to change constitutional rules.
Anderson, supra note 71, at 554.
183. One might also argue that there is neither a constitutional nor state interest
in a responsible press—that is, that no such interest exists at all. Through the
arguments in the above discussion, I attempted to show that the Framers and the
Court envisioned the press as holding a special role within the First Amendment
framework, and that negligent reporting frustrates that role. Moreover, the First
Amendment bears positive elements insofar as it seeks to maximize the spread of
democracy-enhancing and truth-seeking speech. It follows that at the very least, the
government bears a normative duty to regulate the press to ensure that both types of
speech are in fact maximized, which requires the minimization of false speech to the
extent possible. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (holding
that falsehoods have “no constitutional value” and fall under the Chaplinsky category
of unprotected speech); BOLLINGER, supra note 172, at 139 (arguing that the
Supreme Court should allow the regulation of press speech to deter “biases that
skew, distort, and corrupt” discussion of public issues).
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As argued above, the actual malice standard underprotects speech
because it forces the press to bear substantial litigation costs. At the
same time, it overprotects speech by failing to deter media
negligence and providing the press with incentives to engage in
irresponsible conduct.
Lastly, the actual malice standard
underprotects the reputations of plaintiffs because it allows many
reputational injuries to go wholly unremedied based on the flawed
premises that public plaintiffs waive their reputational interests and
can mitigate reputational harm. This Part will examine how other
scholars and jurisdictions have grappled with the problem of
balancing these three competing interests in libel suits and will
conclude by proposing a reform that supplements rather than
replaces the actual malice standard.
A. Alternative Approaches to Defamation Liability
1.

Recent proposals for reform
Having recognized the failure of Sullivan to accommodate the
competing interests underlying libel suits, scholars have proposed
reforms of the actual malice standard to strike a better balance
184
One popular proposal is to allow courts to issue
between them.
declaratory judgments that specified statements are false, which
would rectify injured reputations without imposing liability on media
185
defendants. An assessment of the veracity of a published statement
does not turn on the state-of-mind of the media defendant, and
accordingly no discovery is required to successfully bring a
186
declaratory judgment action.
Likewise, if declaratory judgments
184. See infra notes 185 & 195; see also Anderson, supra note 71, at 552 (suggesting
that a drastic approach to reforming libel law would be for the Court to “retrench” its
holdings in libel law by abandoning the actual malice standard altogether).
185. See, e.g., H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., (1985), reprinted in 74 CAL. L. REV. 809, 832
(1986) (proposing a declaratory judgment proceeding as a new cause of action for
defamation exercisable at the option of defendants); see also Sam Conner et al., Model
Communicative Torts Act, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1990) (demonstrating the
substance of a model provision that would impose liability for injury to reputation in
an action either for declaratory judgment or special damages, and presuming
reputational harm in any action for declaratory judgment). But see Barrett, supra
note 71, at 852-53 (explaining the differences between the declaratory judgment
alternative proposed in H.R. 2846, and the alternative proposed by Professor
Franklin); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74
CAL. L. REV. 809, 812-19 (1986) (introducing a parallel version to H.R. 2846, but
departing from it by limiting the availability of the declaratory judgment remedy to
plaintiffs).
186. See Barrett, supra note 71, at 876 (noting that discovery into the editorial
process would be avoided entirely if defendants win under the declaratory judgment
alternative); Franklin, supra note 185, at 812 (proposing that “[a]ny person who is
the subject of any defamation may bring an action in any court of competent
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wholly replace suits for monetary awards, the pecuniary incentive for
187
bringing libel suits would be eliminated. To the extent that a court
decree of a statement’s falsity serves as an adequate remedy for a
defamatory statement, declaratory judgments would also avoid the
188
underprotection of plaintiffs’ reputations.
The declaratory judgment proposal, however, would exacerbate
irresponsible media conduct by failing to address it altogether.
Granted, replacing the actual malice standard would eliminate the
incentives pushing against fully investigating stories or
communicating concerns regarding a story’s accuracy. Yet where
media defendants have no fear of liability, they have little reason to
189
ensure the factual accuracy of their reports.
A major newspaper
may hope to foster a reputation for accuracy, but the same cannot be
said for smaller news organizations, particularly those that do not
seek profit, have a monopoly over a small market, or are published
190
on the Internet.
Furthermore, Sullivan revealed that even the
employees of prominent news organizations might fail to diligently
191
The Times and other
check the accuracy of their publications.
jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment,” and that such an action should not require
proof of the defendant’s state of mind); see also James H. Hulme, Vindicating
Reputation: An Alternative to Damages as a Remedy for Defamation, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 375,
389–90 (1980-81) (recognizing that because declaratory judgment actions brought by
plaintiffs are motivated not by damages, but rather by vindication and the desire to
clear one’s name, the sole issue is the veracity of the defamatory material).
187. Under Professor Franklin’s reform proposal, the declaratory judgment is only
an optional source of recourse for a plaintiff. Thus, the proposal does not fully avoid
the underprotection of media speech because the possibilities of large jury awards
and litigation costs remain. Professor Franklin’s proposal does provide, however,
that prevailing plaintiffs at the declaratory judgment phase are barred from later
seeking damages. Franklin, supra note 185, at 813.
Professor Barrett’s proposal would avoid this problem by giving defendants the
option of going to declaratory judgment. This would allow defendants to avoid
litigation expenses. Barrett, supra note 71, at 864-65. However, media defendants
that intentionally publish false statements would almost always turn to declaratory
judgments for a simple reason: the state-of-mind of its reporters would not be
exposed in a declaratory judgment proceeding. Thus, the declaratory judgment
provides little disincentive to newspapers that intentionally lie to the public, whereas
the actual malice standard (to the extent that liability under Sullivan is accurately
determined) provides exactly that.
188. See Hulme, supra note 186, at 389–90 (arguing that a formal court
determination as to the falsity of a defamatory statement “vindicates” the
reputational injury of the statement).
189. See Franklin, supra note 185, at 839 (criticizing the declaratory judgment
action proposed in H.R. 2846 as removing the deterrent effect of libel law on
irresponsible publishing).
190. Indeed, if Professor Fiss’s comments on media market failures reveal
anything, it is that publishing some false statements might increase a news
organization’s popularity and hence, also increase its revenue stream. See Fiss, supra
note 166, at 787-88 (asserting that the media market, though diversified within itself,
moves collectively in one direction and is limited by market reach).
191. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1964).
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major media organizations have greater incentive to oversee their
employees’ conduct where those organizations are threatened with
liability for negligent reporting. Finally, the declaratory judgment
proposal can promote recklessness on the part of news organizations
seeking to get a “hot” story out without adequately reviewing it, as the
absence of any liability undercuts the need for caution before
releasing damaging statements.
The source of these flaws in the declaratory judgment proposal is
that the interest in a responsible press is procedural rather than
192
substantive. In other words, the interest does not concern the mere
falsehood of media statements. Instead, it focuses on the conduct
193
As the Court has
leading to the publication of falsehoods.
recognized, the publication of falsehoods is inevitable in any society
194
that protects free expression.
Irresponsible media conduct,
however, is not. At least in theory, negligent journalism can be
deterred with an appropriate standard of liability, and consequently,
195
fewer instances of defamatory speech would accrue.
Alternative reform proposals would provide absolute protection to
196
the press for specified categories of speech. While these proposals
would extirpate the chilling effect on the press, they would also
promote media irresponsibility and would fail to sufficiently remedy
reputational injuries. Conversely, courts could allow for increased
liability against the press or, in the extreme case, impose strict liability

192. See Blasi, supra note 147, at 586 (noting that the “shortcoming of
contemporary journalism concerns not the subject matter of reportage but the
manner”).
193. See id. (expressing concern that there is not enough active, in-depth press
coverage of the government, especially because it is easy for the media to rely on the
government’s self-issued press releases instead of conducting independent
investigations).
194. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271.
195. A related proposal would create a no-money, no-fault trial by which a jury
could render judgments on the truth of allegedly defamatory publications. See Pierre
N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in its Proper Place, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1987-88) (advancing an alternative type of libel action, in which
no damages would be awarded). This no-money, no-fault proposal is problematic for
the same reasons as is the declaratory judgment alternative, but with the added flaw
of increasing litigation costs.
196. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 295 (Black, J., concurring) (asserting that the
Constitution granted the press an “absolute immunity for criticism of the way public
officials do their public duty”); id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (supporting an
“absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct”). But see Lillian
Bevier, The Invisible Hand of the Marketplace of Ideas, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 233–35 (Lee Bollinger & Geoffrey Stone eds., 2002)
(arguing that the press should be held “accountable for the harms that defects in its
products cause”).
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197

for the publication of false statements. It might at first seem that a
strict liability standard, which could turn on the substance of a
statement or the procedures followed in publishing it, might impact
media responsibility by prompting the press to create and adhere to
its own codes of conduct that maximize truth-telling. However, that
standard would open the doors to litigation before potentially biased
juries and generate the self-imposed chilling effect feared by the
198
Court.
This examination of potential reforms reveals that there is an
inherent tension between the interests at play in libel suits.
Increasing liability for defamation would deter irresponsible
reporting, yet any recourse that involves monetary awards risks
199
chilling press speech.
Similarly, replacing the Sullivan standard
with a pretrial procedure or a no-fault action may avoid a chilling
effect, yet in addition to the under-deterrence of media negligence
that would result, it is far from clear that a court determination of the
veracity of speech vindicates reputational injury. The result is a loselose situation, since either awarding or failing to award monetary
damages cannot fully accommodate the competing interests at stake
in libel suits.
One might conclude from this tension that it is impossible to
adequately balance the three interests, and that the Sullivan standard
may simply represent the best of a slew of unsatisfying options. This
conclusion is premature. The shortcomings of the aforementioned
reform proposals reveal that the solution to the Sullivan conundrum
will not arise from tinkering with the types and degree of remedies
200
available to plaintiffs.
That is, the ideal balance between the
competing interests may be struck by working outside the box of
remedies and standards of liability. Before attempting to meet that
197. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 52, at 148–49 (arguing for a return to commonlaw principles of strict liability to determine liability, a proposition that would
eliminate punitive damages since money should be secondary to restoration of
reputation); Susana Frederick Fischer, Rethinking Sullivan: New Approaches in
Australia, New Zealand, and England, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 101, 107-08 (2002)
(arguing against a broad constitutional standard and in favor of an extension of
common-law qualified privilege).
198. Professor Anderson raises another point: by eliminating the actual malice
standard, the Court would also reduce uniformity in defamation liability, which
could have its own chilling effect on the media. See Anderson, supra note 71, at 553
(recognizing that non-uniformity is especially dangerous in libel law due to the
inherent interstate mobility of speech).
199. While the media’s efforts to avoid liability might appear to be a step toward
more responsible journalism, these restraints create their own chilling effects on the
press. See infra notes 217-221 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 185-198 and accompanying text (elaborating on how efforts to
protect one interest seem to exacerbate the underprotection of another interest).
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challenge, it is instructive to examine the way that Britain has
addressed defamation liability.
2.

Recent trends in British libel law
201
In Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., the House of Lords initiated a
radical change in British law by recognizing a new standard of
defamation liability that turns on the responsibility of a media
defendant’s conduct. Albert Reynolds, the former Irish Taoiseach,
initiated the suit in response to an article published by The Sunday
Times in 1994 that claimed that Reynolds lied to and withheld
202
important information from the Irish government.
Reynolds
argued that The Sunday Times engaged in irresponsible conduct in
reporting the story; specifically, the sole source of the article was one
of Reynolds’s political opponents and the article failed to report on
the explanation Reynolds provided the Irish government regarding
203
the alleged malfeasance.
The newspaper argued that the court should impose a standard
similar to Sullivan, wherein a speaker would be protected from
liability for speech related to “political information” unless the
204
speech was uttered with actual malice.
The House of Lords
disagreed. In the decision, Lord Nicholls argued that the proposed
malice standard insufficiently remedies reputational harm because
that standard is “notoriously difficult to prove” and would protect
newspapers in pursuit of a scoop that release defamatory statements
205
“based on the slenderest of materials.”
Instead, the House of Lords created an “elastic” ten-factor
balancing test that looks to the public importance of the speech’s
206
subject matter and the reasonableness of the speaker’s conduct.
Those ten factors, as presented by Lord Nicholls, are:
(1)

The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the
charge, the more the public is misinformed and the
individual harmed, if the allegation is not true.

(2)

The nature of the information, and the extent to which the
subject matter is a matter of public concern.

201. [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.).
202. Id. at 191.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 200 (arguing for a standard based solely on the subject matter of the
publication).
205. Id. at 201.
206. Id. at 204.
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(3)

The source of the information. Some informants have no
direct knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to
grind, or are being paid for their stories.

(4)
(5)

Steps taken to verify the story . . . .
The status of the information. The allegation may have
already been the subject of an investigation which
commands respect.

(6)

The urgency of the matter.
commodity.

(7)

Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff. He may
have information others do not possess or have not
disclosed. An approach to the plaintiff will not always be
necessary.

(8)

Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side
of the story.

(9)

The tone of the article. A newspaper can raise queries or call
for an investigation. It need not adopt allegations as
statements of fact.

News is often a perishable

207

(10) The circumstances of publication, including the timing.

Because The Sunday Times failed to publish Reynolds’s explanation for
his conduct, used an unreliable source, and presented the allegation
as a hard fact, the House of Lords found that the newspaper failed
208
the balancing test.
Despite creating a test that focuses on the defendant’s negligence,
Lord Nicholls described the decision as merely seeking to
accommodate the interests in reputation and avoiding a chilling
209
effect on the press.
Given the factors in the balancing test,
however, it appears that Lord Nicholls was primarily concerned with
the interest in promoting a responsible press. Thus, it comes as no
210
surprise that in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL, a recent
decision that reaffirmed the ten-part test, the House of Lords
207. Id. at 205.
208. Id. at 206.
209. Id. at 205. Lord Nicholls implied that the need for a responsible press is built
into the plaintiff’s interest in an uninjured reputation. Under this view, the interest
of responsible journalism is in fact a private interest held by the plaintiff. That is, the
only interest held by the plaintiff is that damaging statements about the plaintiff are
made in compliance with the Reynolds standard of fair reporting. Nevertheless, it is
impossible to escape the conclusion that the interest in a responsible press is, to at
least some degree, social. This is revealed by the fact that Lord Nicholls discussed at
length the importance of free expression in facilitating political matters. Id. at 204–
06.
210. [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359 (appeal taken from Eng.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd061011/jamee.pd
f.
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described Reynolds as having created a “test of responsible
211
journalism.” Lord Bingham also noted that the House of Lords in
Reynolds accepted that the publication of false statements is inevitable
in a society that protects speech and therefore sought to ensure that a
“publisher is protected if he has taken such steps as a responsible
journalist would take to try and ensure that what is published is
212
accurate and fit for publication.”
Less than a decade following Reynolds, it remains unclear how
213
strong an impact the decision will have on British law. For the time
being, British libel law remains far more plaintiff-friendly than its
American counterpart, given that the burden remains on British
defendants to establish the veracity of allegedly defamatory
214
statements. Reynolds and Jameel are certainly signs that British law is
shifting toward greater protection of media defendants, yet the
House of Lords in Jameel emphatically underscored that such
215
protection is available only to a responsible press.
The scope of
protection for the press therefore turns on the meaning of
“responsibility,” which will not be fully identified until the Reynolds
216
test is refined by lower courts in the years to come. If the House of
Lords deems the Reynolds test a success, it is conceivable that the test
211. See id. at 32, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, 377 (interpreting the Reynolds test as a general
guiding principle, rather than a series of individual criteria in order to promote
veracity and truthfulness in publications concerning the public interest); see also
Bonnick v. Morris, [2002] UKPC 31, [23], [2003] 1 A.C. 300, 309 (“Stated shortly,
the Reynolds privilege is concerned to provide a proper degree of protection for
responsible journalism when reporting matters of public concern.”).
212. Jameel, [2006] UKHL 44, 32, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, 377.
213. For example, Alan Rusbridger, the editor of the Guardian, stated in response
to Jameel that “[the decision] will lead to a greater robustness and willingness to
tackle serious stories.” Sarah Lyall, High Court in Britain Loosens Strict Libel Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2006, at A10; see DAVID PRICE & KORIEH DUODU, DEFAMATION: LAW,
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 110–11 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing applications of the Lord
Nicholls’ test in the years after Reynolds was decided, noting in particular that neutral
reporting weighs heavily in favor of a finding of responsible journalistic conduct).
214. See Anderson, supra note 71, at 504–05 (discussing the importance of placing
the burden of establishing falsity on plaintiffs in American libel suits). Scholars have
questioned whether Reynolds provided enough protection for media defendants. See
Weaver & Bennett, supra note 118, at 1156 (arguing that while the British media
appears “robust,” the press remains vulnerable to a chilling effect stemming from
Britain’s liberal standards of liability in defamation suits).
215. Baroness Hale argued that Britain “need[s] more such serious journalism,”
and to that end “our defamation law should encourage rather than discourage it.”
Jameel, [2006] UKHL 44, at 150, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, 409.
216. Lord Nicholls emphasized in Reynolds that the lower British courts must
refine the relatively open-ended standard of responsible journalism as they apply it to
cases. See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 205 (H.L.)
(rationalizing that a judge is better equipped to interpret the criteria than a jury). In
Jameel, Lord Hoffman compared this process to the development of any professional
standards of reasonable conduct within common law. [2006] UKHL 44, at 55,
[2007] 1 A.C. 359, 383.
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will be expanded to cover statements beyond those of public
217
importance.
While the Reynolds test will certainly compel newspapers to adhere
to a minimum standard of responsible conduct, it fails to reduce
litigation costs and therefore risks imposing a chilling effect on the
218
press.
As scholars and journalists have noted, Reynolds sets forth a
vague and highly discretionary test that leaves news organizations
219
incapable of predicting the outcome of defamation suits.
The
indeterminacy of the Reynolds test has left litigious plaintiffs with an
incentive to roll the dice at trial or to threaten suit in pursuit of a
settlement. Additionally, British news organizations have incurred
220
tremendous costs to comply with the Reynolds factors. For example,
it is not uncommon for major newspapers to retain a legal editorial
221
staff to ensure that stories comply with responsible procedures.
While the goal of promoting a responsible press is certainly noble, its

217. See SMOLLA, supra note 119, at § 1:9.50 (arguing that recent decisions portend
more acceptance of free speech defenses in the U.K.); see also Amber Melville-Brown,
The Impact of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, 18 COMM. LAW. 25, 28–29 (2001)
(reiterating the views of prominent British lawyers that the Reynolds decision was
“potentially revolutionary” and would “open[] up a distinct privilege for investigative
journalism,” despite concerns that such flexible standards would be difficult to
apply) (quotations omitted).
Even if the Reynolds standard does not expand within British law, it has certainly
expanded to other commonwealth countries. All of them have rejected Sullivan and
most have recognized standards of liability that turn at least in part on responsible
journalism. See Lange v. Atkinson, [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 385, 400-01 (C.A.) (holding
that a defendant that engages in careless journalism and acts “without considering or
caring whether it was true or false” can be held liable) (citation omitted); Lange v.
Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 532-33, 546 (Austl.) (holding that
qualified privilege extended to a communication made to the public on a
government or political matter, but only where the defendant’s actions were
reasonable); Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.)
(refusing to create a standard of liability in the mold of Sullivan, declaring that
“[t]he law of defamation is not [so] unduly restrictive or inhibiting”).
218. See Russell L. Weaver et al., Defamation Law and Free Speech: Reynolds v. Times
Newspapers and the English Media, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1255, 1263 (2004)
(conceding that the costs of litigating defamation lawsuits routinely outstrip the
damages a litigant might receive).
219. See id. at 1291, 1303 (arguing that the Reynolds test has caused uncertainty
amongst the English media because it remains unclear how certain conduct will be
judged under the criteria); PRICE & DUODU, supra note 213, at 110 (noting that the
ambit of the Reynolds test was left largely undetermined, such that the test would
“give rise to an undesirable element of uncertainty”).
220. See Weaver, supra note 218, at 1291–97 (describing Reynolds’ impact on the
editorial processes, including the purchase of defamation insurance to reduce
litigation costs, and the hiring of attorneys to review articles for compliance with the
Reynolds factors).
221. See Weaver & Bennett, supra note 120, at 1172 (noting that the newspapers’
actual purpose is not to strengthen the veracity of published stories, but rather to
ensure that the editors will have legally admissible evidence to reduce liability in
defamation suits).
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high price tag may chill the media’s willingness to report on
222
potentially defamatory matters or litigious individuals.
B. The Proposal
The three competing interests in defamation suits can be almost
perfectly accommodated by blending the declaratory judgment
223
proposal and the Reynolds test. That is, a media defendant should
have the option of avoiding defamation liability by obtaining a pretrial determination that it adhered to responsible journalistic
procedures. Under this summary proceeding, the defendant would
have the burden of establishing that it satisfied a baseline standard of
reasonable press conduct. If successful, the suit would terminate, and
the defendant would avoid liability altogether. If unsuccessful, the
litigation would proceed under the actual malice standard.
The standard of responsible media conduct would be similar to the
test created in Reynolds, but with some important differences. First,
the Reynolds factors focus too heavily on the circumstances of
publication and too little on the procedures used in publishing the
224
allegedly defamatory statement. That is, while the circumstances of
the publication should bear on the level of scrutiny a statement
receives, the Reynolds test fails to sufficiently promote reporting
procedures that would optimize the output of truthful statements.
Second, the Reynolds test fails to account for a media defendant’s
behavior after the publication of a false statement. That is, it does
not consider whether and to what extent a news organization
publishes a retraction to a defamatory statement.
Accordingly, the ideal set of factors considered in the summary
proceeding would be as follows:
(1) The amount of investigation—the number of reporters and
time spent reporting—weighed against the public importance
of the statement and magnitude of foreseeable reputational
harm inflicted.

222. See Weaver, supra note 218, at 1282, 1288-90 (discussing the impact of
Reynolds on newspapers’ willingness to report on litigious individuals and contentious
matters).
223. This proposal refers specifically to Professor Barrett’s version of the
declaratory judgment proposal. See Barrett supra note 71, at 863 (advancing the
strengths of declaratory judgment in that it targets the source of tension and focuses
primarily on accuracy).
224. For example, four of the ten Reynolds factors focus on the importance of the
information, the status of the information, the urgency of the story, and the timing
of publication. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 205 (H.L.).
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(2) The degree to which the allegedly defamatory statements were
fact-checked, weighed against the reliability of the
information’s sources.
(3) The number of editors attached to the story and amount of
time spent reviewing it.
(4) The time-sensitivity of the story, relative to its public
importance. Merely seeking to get a scoop is not sufficient
grounds for failing to adequately check a story.
(5) Whether comment from the plaintiff was timely requested in a
manner that was reasonably tailored to reach the plaintiff, and
whether the publication fairly and accurately reflected those
comments.
(6) Whether the newspaper retracted the story, and whether the
retraction was sufficient relative to the prominence of the
story’s original publication and the magnitude of reputational
harm inflicted.
For example, a defamatory statement
published on the front page of a newspaper should be
retracted on the front page.
(7) Whether the circumstances of the case or the evidence
provided suggest that the newspaper was aware of the falsity of
225
its statement upon publishing it.
While the plaintiff may
offer evidence of actual malice, the plaintiff will have no access
to discovery from the defendant.
The first four factors relate to the procedures used in reporting
and editing the story. Those factors do not specify the procedures
that news organizations must adopt, but rather focus on whether the
procedures implemented were reasonable in light of the public
importance and time-sensitivity of the story. The first factor concerns
the adequacy of the reporting itself, the second and third with the
adequacy of editorial review, and the fourth with the degree of
scrutiny warranted in evaluating the reasonableness of the
defendant’s conduct. The fifth and sixth factors protect the
reputations of the injured plaintiffs from libelous speech by

225. For a similar suggestion in cases involving questions of fact that turn on the
defendants’ state-of-mind, see David A. Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the
Summary Judgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 774, 795 (1983)
(arguing that “when the movant offers evidence demonstrating innocent motive or
lack of intent, summary judgment should be granted unless the non-movant offers
substantial probative evidence contradicting the evidence provided by the movant”);
see also Martin B. Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in
Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 715–18 (1984) (arguing for a
reduced burden of proof in defamation summary judgment proceedings to allow for
the burden to be shifted to plaintiffs to provide prima facie evidence of actual malice).
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providing opportunities for counterspeech both during and after
publication.
The final factor is essential to ensure that a defendant, to the
greatest extent possible without infringing on the other two interests,
does not escape liability for publishing defamatory statements that
are intentionally or recklessly published. Evidence presented by the
plaintiff or, in rare cases, the circumstances of the publication may
226
suggest that the defendant acted with actual malice.
In the rare
cases where such evidence outweighs the six other factors, the judge
may refuse to find for the defendant, and the case will proceed. In
arguing that a defendant acted with actual malice, the plaintiff will
not have access to discovery as to the state of mind of the reporters or
editors attached to the story. While obtaining sufficient evidence of
actual malice may be difficult absent some measure of discovery,
allowing discovery would enable plaintiffs to impose substantial
227
litigation costs on media defendants. Plaintiffs retain the option of
conducting their own investigations, such as obtaining statements
from the individuals quoted in an article.
While the exclusion of discovery may allow some defendants to
228
avoid liability for false statements published with actual malice, the
summary proceeding largely eliminates the likelihood of that
outcome. That is, a plaintiff may persuade a judge that the
defendant relied on too few sources in publishing a story or that the
sources used were unreliable. Even if a defendant relied on a
sufficient number of sources, the plaintiff may establish that the
defendant manipulated their comments. Moreover, the defendant
may have failed to adequately discuss or investigate mitigating

226. See, e.g., Reynolds, 2 A.C. at 206 (placing particular weight on the defendant’s
failure to include the plaintiff’s version of story on a simple hunch, rather than
conducting his own investigation).
227. Skeptics may argue that eliminating discovery will be unfair to plaintiffs, who
will find it difficult to establish actual malice or to rebut a media defendant’s
evidence of responsible journalism. Although it is certainly not necessary to
completely cut off discovery, there must be strictly enforced limits to discovery to
avoid imposing the litigation costs on media defendants that the proposed summary
proceeding is tailored to circumvent. However, as this Article argues, discovery is not
wholly necessary. Evidence of irresponsible practices or, in rare cases, of actual
malice can be established through evidence obtained through plaintiffs’ own
investigations. Additionally, plaintiffs will have access to reporters’ and editors’ notes
and any other evidence of their states-of-mind that are presented by defendants to
establish their responsible conduct.
228. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 n.25 (1979) (noting that the
discovery generated nearly 3,000 pages and 240 exhibits as well as sustaining
substantial legal fees); Anderson, supra note 71, at 517 (depicting the actual malice
standard as a complex factual issue that sometimes requires large amounts of
discovery to prove).
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evidence brought to its attention by a source. Thus, the very fact that
the summary proceeding promotes responsible media conduct
substantially limits media defendants’ ability to escape liability for
reporting in bad faith.
The sixth factor, concerning the retraction of a defamatory
statement, should be given more weight than the others. Through
that factor, a media defendant almost always has an escape hatch
from litigation. Unless the defendant is found to have egregiously
violated the other factors, it can guarantee an end to further
proceedings by admitting that a published statement was false and
retracting a story. More importantly, a newspaper has the option of
retracting a statement following the summary proceeding. That is, a
judge can find that the defendant negligently reported a story but
explicitly leave open a window to publish a sufficient retraction that
thereby allows the defendant to terminate the litigation.
C. Advantages
The proposed summary proceeding accommodates all the interests
at stake in defamation suits, and it avoids the underprotection of
reputation in three important respects. First, it encourages the press
to seek comment from the targets of potentially defamatory
statements, thereby allowing them to mitigate reputational harm
concurrent to the publication of false statements. Second, it provides
strong incentive for defendants to retract false statements in a
manner reasonably tailored to reach the same readership as the
original publication. Third, by promoting reporting procedures that
optimize truth-telling, it prevents the occurrence of reputational
harms in the first place.
The proposed proceeding avoids the under- and over-protection of
speech by ensuring that libel suits are quickly and efficiently
concluded in a manner that promotes optimized reporting
229
procedures. That is, it allows defendants to avoid both liability and
litigation costs by complying with a basic standard of responsible
journalism. The elimination of litigation costs is thus held out as a
carrot that compels journalists to alter their behavior. The speedy

229. See Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of
Process in Libel Litigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1784 (1998) (arguing that the First
Amendment contains a procedural guarantee for “accuracy, speed and efficiency” in
disposing of defamation suits).
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nature of the proceeding and prohibition of discovery further
230
minimizes media defendants’ legal costs.
The absence of discovery also provides media defendants with a
231
means of protecting their privacy. The proposed proceeding allows
defendants to present whatever evidence they choose in arguing that
they complied with the standard of responsible journalism.
Defendants are not obligated to turn over any notes or the identity of
232
any source.
Indeed, defendants have the option of refusing to
initiate the pre-trial proceeding altogether.
While the proposed proceeding is less vague than the Reynolds test,
any standard of media responsibility will be vulnerable to some
degree of vagueness and thus will ultimately be at the judge’s
233
discretion.
Yet two points are worth noting. Because British libel
law is considerably plaintiff-friendly, the cost of failing the Reynolds
234
test far exceeds that of failing the proposed proceeding. Under the
proposal, if a defendant fails to establish that it acted responsibly, the
course of litigation continues as it would have otherwise, and actual
malice will remain difficult to establish. In other words, where less is
230. See Anderson v. Stanco Sports Library, Inc., 542 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1976)
(noting that the use of summary judgment in libel cases would avoid chilling speech
by avoiding the litigation of meritless cases); Bon Air Hotel v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d
858, 865 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[T]he failure to dismiss a libel suit might necessitate long
and expensive trial proceedings, which, if not really warranted, would themselves
offend the principles enunciated in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) . . .
because of the chilling effect of such litigation.”) (citation omitted); see also
Edgartown Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. Johnson, 522 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (D. Mass.
1981) (“The threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit brought by a popular
public official may be as chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear
of the outcome of the lawsuit itself.”) (citation omitted).
231. The Supreme Court has recognized that increasing grants of summary
judgment would avoid requiring media defendants to comply with intrusive
discovery. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 180 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) (holding that
courts should delay ordering defendants to comply with discovery requests where
issues pertinent to those requests can be avoided through summary judgment).
232. Naturally, relying on an unnamed source should provide a newspaper with
less protection than a named source, though Lord Nicholls did not seem to think so.
See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 205 (H.L.) (adding that
journalists often do not have the benefit of hindsight when meeting publication
deadlines).
233. This is due to the flexible nature of the proposed standard, which mimics the
flexibility envisioned by Lord Nicholls. See Reynolds, 2 A.C. at 204-05 (granting
discretion to judges to interpret and apply the ten factors); see also Russell L. Weaver
& David F. Partlett, International and Comparative Perspectives on Defamation, Free Speech,
and Privacy: Defamation, Free Speech, and Democratic Governance, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
57, 76 (2006) (commenting that the large number of Reynolds factors, coupled with
the few decisions interpreting those factors, has not provided the media with clear
signals on how to act under the new framework).
234. This assessment does not even consider the costs associated with preventing
libel suits, which have increased for British media outlets since Reynolds. See Weaver
& Partlett, supra note 233, at 77 (calculating the media’s increased legal costs as they
retain more lawyers to “Reynoldize” the stories).
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at stake in enforcing the standard of responsible journalism, a degree
of uncertainty is tolerable.
Additionally, the proposed standard provides a tremendous benefit
to the press at no additional cost. Beyond the obvious benefit of
providing a strong defense to defamation liability, the vagueness of
the standard is itself an asset for the press. That is, it allows the media
to create its own codes of conduct that shield it from liability, as long
as those codes satisfy the baseline threshold of responsibility.
Moreover, because defendants may refuse to initiate the summary
proceeding, they can circumvent the standard of responsible
journalism altogether if it concerns them.
Although summary-judgment proceedings are currently available
in defamation suits, basing liability on a state-of-mind test has made it
235
difficult to dispose of cases before trial.
A standard of
reasonableness—while fact-sensitive—is objective, and thus highly
amenable to pre-trial determination. Moreover, as the House of
Lords recognized in Reynolds, turning liability on a list of factors
allows for the development of a body of precedent upon which judges
236
can rely. The use of a summary proceeding will therefore provide
greater consistency to defamation suits. Likewise, the proposed
proceeding is advantageous because it takes the fate of media
defendants out of the hands of potentially biased jurors, who render
factual determinations in a black box. Judges’ decisions must be
openly justified, and biased decisions are checked by the availability
of appeal. Accordingly, the expanded availability of pre-trial disposal
will make defamation suits more predictable, which should further
decrease media defendants’ legal expenses.
D. Remaining Issues
1.

Should courts create a standard of responsible journalism?
The Supreme Court has twice implicitly held that courts should not
create standards of conduct for journalists: first in Sullivan, and then
235. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (noting that a
finding of actual malice is not easily arrived at during the summary judgment stage);
Sonenshein, supra note 225, at 786-87 (noting that courts are inconsistent in
assessing state-of-mind evidence at summary judgment); see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1986) (holding that clear and convincing evidence
is required to succeed on summary judgment in defamation suits); Anderson, supra
note 71, at 498–99 (arguing that Anderson made it easier to win on summary
judgment only insofar as it requires that key factual issues be resolved through
discovery).
236. [2001] 2 A.C. at 205 (acknowledging that deferring to the judge is a
doctrinally sound established practice).
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237

in Curtis Publishing v. Butts. By shielding the press from defamation
liability, Sullivan sought to substantially limit judicial supervision of
238
the press. Three years later, in Curtis, Justice Harlan advocated for
the reformation of the actual malice standard to promote responsible
239
journalism. Under Justice Harlan’s standard, defendants would be
held liable for engaging in “highly unreasonable conduct constituting
an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
240
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.” In the
plurality opinion, Chief Justice Warren provided the deciding vote in
a separate concurrence but refused to backtrack from the Sullivan
241
standard. The question the Court has failed to definitively answer is
whether judges should engage in creating a standard of responsible
journalism, if they are even capable of doing so.
In an obvious sense, the actual-malice standard is itself a baseline
constitutional limit on acceptable press conduct. That is, by refusing
to protect statements made with knowledge or reckless disregard of
falsity, the Court determined that the First Amendment does not
242
tolerate the bad-faith publication of false statements. Sullivan thus
established the functional equivalent of a standard of professional
conduct. Additionally, as discussed above, neither the interest in
avoiding a chilling effect on the press, nor the interest in plaintiffs’
reputations, is sufficient to serve as the theoretical foundation of the
243
actual malice standard. The Court in Sullivan therefore appears to
have been motivated at least in part by the normative conclusion that
the press should not lie to the public.

237. 388 U.S. 130 (1966) (plurality opinion).
238. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1963) (discussing the need
for an open and robust press, despite the possibility of attacks on government and
public officials); Murchison, supra note 5, at 10 (“Journalism was to be free from the
supervision of libel law; only a calculated lie would endanger that freedom.”).
239. See Curtis, 388 U.S. at 135 (desiring a standard that would give the press
sufficient constitutional protection without immunizing them from irresponsibly
hurting the reputations of others).
240. Id. at 155.
241. See id. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (affirming the importance of the
Sullivan standard as a necessary protection for the rights of public officials and the
press).
242. See Susan M. Gilles, The Image of “Good Journalism” in Privilege, Tort law and
Constitutional Law, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 485, 497 (2006) (“The constitutional libel
law cases also reveal that the Court has created a code of good journalism practices.
This was not, perhaps, a conscious decision.”).
243. See supra notes 75-76, 95-101 and accompanying text (criticizing the actual
malice standard as releasing the press from any incentive to report reasonably as long
as their conscience is clean and giving certain individuals less access to public
counterspeech than more prominent officials and thus making it less likely for them
to receive damages for libel).
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Sullivan also indirectly led to a court-created standard of
responsible journalism by allowing plaintiffs to use circumstantial and
244
behavioral evidence to prove media defendants’ states of mind.
That was the conclusion of a 1994 study by a group of defamation
scholars who examined all state and federal defamation suits
245
following Sullivan.
They found that lower court decisions in the
decades after Sullivan “spawned a de facto set of judge-made standards
that covers all aspects of journalistic behavior,” including the
246
investigation, writing and editing of news stories.
As the authors of the study argued, the piecemeal method by which
lower courts created de facto standards of responsible journalism has
led to a chilling effect on speech by opening the door to increased
247
findings of liability against the press.
The haphazard creation of
the de facto standards has also led to complex litigation, which has
248
The proposed summary
increased costs for media defendants.
proceeding would avoid these problems by allowing courts to
explicitly demarcate baseline journalistic norms, an enterprise in
which they are already covertly engaged. As a result, courts would be
more consistent in developing the standard of responsible
journalism, media defendants would have greater notice about the
substance of that standard, litigation costs would be curtailed, and
appellate courts would be better capable of overseeing lower court
decisions.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that courts are incapable of
overseeing journalistic conduct. Courts have already created baseline
standards of professional conduct through the development of
249
common-law malpractice torts.
Judges should find it easier to
create and apply a standard of conduct governing journalism than
244. See Murchison, supra note 5, at 11–12 (criticizing the Sullivan standard
because by allowing circumstantial behavior, such as use of sources and quality of
writing, the Court imposed greater judicial supervision, rather than reducing it).
245. See id. (remarking that the press seemed to have little inclination to question
the new defamation paradigm due to the lack of understanding of Sullivan’s true
implications).
246. Id. at 12.
247. See id. at 14 (lamenting that Sullivan’s paradoxical logic imposes “an
increasingly comprehensive and intrusive set of behavioral standards for the press”).
The de facto standards are akin to the Reynolds test, insofar as liability itself turns on
having satisfied baseline requirements of responsible journalism.
248. See id. at 10 (discovering that while the number of judgments against the
press may have decreased since Sullivan, the media has incurred substantially greater
costs).
249. See Robert E. Drechsel, Essay, The Paradox of Professionalism: Journalism and
Malpractice, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 181, 193 (2000) (observing the “obvious
linkage between many of the principles of American libel law and professional
standards”).
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those concerning other, more technical professions like medicine.
Doctors must make highly specialized decisions, often while under
severe time constraints. Journalists, on the other hand, require no
250
specialized licensing and act under relatively artificial deadlines.
Indeed, just as courts have extensive precedent upon which they can
rely in malpractice suits, the evaluation of journalistic conduct will
not occur on a blank slate. Beyond the de facto standards of conduct
already created by lower courts, the majority of state courts apply a
251
negligence standard to defamation cases involving private plaintiffs.
Both should serve as apt resources in developing the standard of
responsible journalism.
The Supreme Court has already shown that it is not averse to
overtly recognizing baseline standards of professional conduct under
252
the Constitution. In Strickland v. Washington, the Court held
attorney performance in criminal cases to a reasonableness standard,
253
citing the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Nevertheless, the
Court refused to delineate “specific guidelines” of acceptable
conduct, choosing instead to rely on “the legal profession’s
maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s presumption
that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the
254
In reaching this conclusion, Justice
Amendment envisions.”
O’Connor argued,
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by
defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how
best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would
interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of
counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making
255
tactical decisions.

Journalism, however, is not an adversarial profession; reporters do
not make nearly the same kind or magnitude of strategic decisions as
256
attorneys.
Thus, while the Supreme Court cannot practicably
250. See Geoffery R. Stone, Why We Need a Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 39, 47 (2005) (lambasting the idea of requiring licensing for journalists because
it would defy more than 200 years of constitutional traditions).
251. See SMOLLA, supra note 119, at § 3:30 (cautioning that the practical
application of defamation liability in several states resembles more of an actual
malice standard than a negligence standard).
252. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
253. See id. at 687-88 (holding that attorney performance must comply with a
standard of “reasonably effective assistance”).
254. Id. at 688.
255. Id. at 688-89.
256. Moreover, while news organizations may face pressing time constraints with
some stories, they presumably have substantial leeway to extend deadlines for many
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determine ex ante which conduct constitutes effective assistance of
counsel, it can prescribe specific procedures that are likely to
optimize the accuracy of news reports.
Additionally, the interests underlying the First Amendment require
the Court to lay down marginally specific guidelines for journalists.
The Strickland Court’s refusal to establish specific guidelines ensured
that the right to a fair trial was not overprotected, because ineffective
257
assistance in one criminal case may be good strategy in another.
The same type of open-ended reasonableness standard, however,
would impede the First Amendment interest in promoting a
responsible press by providing little notice regarding what constitutes
responsible conduct. Loosening ex ante control over the standard of
responsible journalism would also risk creating a chilling effect on
258
the press by increasing error costs at the pre-trial stage.
The proposed standard and Strickland are both apt examples of
experimentalist regulations, which courts are capable of
259
implementing.
Under an experimentalist system, a primary
regulatory body creates flexible norms that are then developed and
refined by lower bodies through continual, transparent negotiation
260
with institutional stakeholders.
Experimentalist systems avoid
cumbersome, top-down oversight by disbursing regulatory power and
261
limiting it with broad goals or guidelines. Strickland was unwittingly
experimentalist:
it created an open standard of attorney
reasonableness that was then developed by lower courts with
262
deference to already-existing professional norms.
Likewise, as

others. Unless they can obtain continuances, lawyers are bound by the schedules set
by courts and thus act under fixed time constraints.
257. One might also argue that the lack of specific guidelines serves criminal
defendants’ interest in a fair trial by failing to restrict the arguments available on
appeal regarding the unreasonableness of an attorney’s conduct.
258. Cf. Barrett, supra note 71, at 858 (viewing the rise in defamation insurance
premiums and shift of reporters to the legal staff as a result of fear over losing libel
suits).
259. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1021-22 (2004) (highlighting
the shift away from command-and-control injunctive regulation toward a more
experimentalist intervention in litigation concerning education, mental health,
prisons, police, and housing).
260. See id. at 1019 (distinguishing command-and-control regulation, which
requires strong central authority and a comprehensive regime of rules, from
experimentalist regulation, which is more flexible).
261. See id. at 1015, 1061-62 (advocating the experimentalist approach’s ability to
modify and adapt to new ideas and norms).
262. See Ivan K. Fong, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 461, 481 (1987) (critiquing the Court in Strickland for creating two seemingly
conflicting standards: one that insists on a fair trial and one that relinquishes
autonomy to the attorney’s judgment).
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noted, because the proposed standard of responsible journalism is
moderately open-ended, journalists will retain substantial control in
fashioning their own codes of conduct. That power will be shaped in
part by the constitutional limits recognized by the Supreme Court
and with the cooperation and oversight of trial judges at the pre-trial
stage.
The proposed standard can therefore be viewed as a limited,
constitutionally mandated structural reform, and meritorious
defamation suits are, in this sense, small-scale instances of structural
reform that partially destabilize media defendants. The press
remains substantially shielded from public control under the First
Amendment, but it is guided by courts toward the adoption of
professional norms that meet a baseline standard of responsibility.
Thus, the proposed standard represents a set of performance goals
for the press—the kind of determination that courts are capable of
making under experimentalist structural reforms. For example, the
standard does not instruct reporters on how to investigate articles,
but it instead informs them that they must create and adhere to a
standard that meets a threshold reasonableness requirement.
As a final matter, it should be noted that the judiciary is the body
best situated to regulate the press. Because judges are insulated from
direct public control and political pressure, they have the least
263
incentive to manipulate the press toward their own ends.
Additionally, the proposed summary proceeding stems from the
Constitution and is therefore almost entirely shielded from the
control of legislative and executive branches at the state and federal
level. Even if government officials bring defamation actions against
the press, judges rendering pre-trial determinations retain ultimate
control over the checking power on the press.
2.

Will individuals bring defamation actions if there is even less chance of
receiving financial recovery than under the actual malice standard?
As noted above, the proposed summary proceeding will prevent
264
Even after a
many reputational injuries from occurring.
263. Although state judges are often elected and therefore less shielded from
external influence, their decisions remain reviewable by the Supreme Court, not to
mention state appellate judges that are less susceptible to public influence.
264. For example, the fifth factor asks whether the press reasonably received
comments from the injured plaintiff, and the sixth factor allows media defendants
the ability to retract a defamatory statement. These criteria provide opportunities for
counterspeech and the chance to reclaim reputation. See Steven J. Heyman, Righting
the Balance: An Inquiry Into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U.
L. REV. 1275, 1360 (1998) (acknowledging that harm to a public official’s reputation
is not as severe when it comes from good-faith criticism because such criticism
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reputational harm has occurred, however, the proposed standard of
responsible journalism affords plaintiffs far greater protection than
would be available solely under the Sullivan standard. Because the
proposal provides media defendants with a strong incentive to retract
false statements, defamed individuals are likely to bring falsehoods to
the media’s attention or to threaten litigation. Inasmuch as people
prefer repairing their damaged reputations to receiving monetary
awards, this outcome is a tremendous boon to those harmed by the
265
publication of false statements.
The availability of an inexpensive and speedy summary proceeding
will also substantially reduce plaintiffs’ pre-trial litigation costs and
provide a free glimpse at the editorial procedures underlying the
publication of alleged falsehoods. Plaintiffs therefore retain financial
incentive to bring defamation actions against media defendants at
least up to the pre-trial stage. The result of the proposed proceeding
should be an increase in pre-trial litigation, but a substantial decrease
in cases that survive it. Should the defendant lose at the pre-trial
stage, the plaintiff can then reassess the viability of continuing the
defamation action. In that event, the plaintiff may deem his or her
prospects for success at trial or at receiving a settlement more likely,
and accordingly may maintain the suit. Either way, the proposed
proceeding will allow more plaintiffs to have their day in court, even
if it does not expand the number of plaintiffs who receive monetary
awards.
3.

How does the proposal account for the distinction between media and
non-media defendants?
Because this Article has focused on the need for a responsible
press, it has deliberately refrained from discussing the distinction
between media and non-media defendants. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine what entities fall under the rubric “media,”
266
especially following the advent of the Internet. Yet that distinction
enables self-governance, and because those public officials can engage in
counterspeech).
265. See Randall P. Bezanson et al., The Economics of Libel: An Empirical Assessment,
in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 22 (Everette E. Dennis &
Eli M. Noam eds., 1989) (arguing that defamation plaintiffs “are often not motivated
chiefly by money; that [plaintiffs’] actions are not based on economically rational
decisions about the prospects of financial recovery in litigation; and that the
economic calculus that governs negotiation in libel cases has ‘surprisingly little
relation to the rules of defamation liability’”).
266. See, e.g., Perzanowski, supra note 104, at 835, 851–52 (observing that the ease
and frequency of individual contributions to the marketplace of ideas has allowed
private citizens to act as both the audience and the source for information regarding
public figures).
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is unnecessary under the proposed summary proceeding. Given the
need for an optimized marketplace of ideas and political discourse
founded on truthful premises, the public is better off if the
individuals and entities reporting facts are capable of doing so under
a baseline standard of diligence. Those who choose to disseminate
information at the heart of either the marketplace of ideas or of
political discourse should be capable of checking facts, investigating
leads and publishing retractions that can reasonably alleviate
reputational injury.
Thus, as a normative matter, defamation liability should deter
individuals incapable of responsibly reporting from publishing
injurious facts about others. If the standard of responsible journalism
is universally applied, people will be more likely to turn damaging
information over to individuals or entities with access to greater
267
investigative resources.
Holding individuals like bloggers to a
standard of responsible reporting also increases the likelihood that
they are certain of the accuracy of the statements they publish and
that they conduct whatever investigation they can prior to releasing
harmful information.
CONCLUSION
The irony of Sullivan is that the Times would have avoided liability if
it had satisfied any of the proposed criteria of responsible journalism.
Editors at the Times could have contacted the signatories of the
political advertisement, checked the facts with their Alabama reporter
or against their own articles, or published a timely correction. Each
was a cheap and easy option. The Times employees acted in good
faith, yet they wantonly brought the litigation upon the newspaper by
failing to adhere to a baseline standard of professionalism.
Indeed, the Sullivan standard itself, although fashioned with the
objective of protecting press speech, needlessly sacrifices the best
interests of the public, not to mention the reputations of individuals
harmed by the spread of falsehoods. Justice White eloquently noted
this outcome:
The New York Times rule thus countenances two evils: first, the
stream of information about public officials and public affairs is
polluted and often remains polluted by false information; and
second, the reputation and professional life of the defeated
plaintiff may be destroyed by falsehoods that might have been

267. But see Franklin, supra note 185, at 838 (acknowledging that some determined
publishers might still disseminate false material in an effort to build audiences).
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avoided with a reasonable effort to investigate the facts. In terms of
the First Amendment and reputational interests at stake, these
268
seem grossly perverse results.

Justice White recognized that what is at stake in libel suits far exceeds
the promotion of an abstract, albeit compelling, need for a fearless
press.
When the public lacks confidence in the competence of the
institutional press, it effectively loses the sole independent watchdog
269
of public representations.
People are bombarded with messages
from interested parties on a daily basis: government officials hold
news conferences, organizations issue press releases, and companies
advertise their products. During an election campaign, candidates
air myriad commercials promoting their platforms or lambasting
opponents. All of those representations are vital to the functionality
of the political process and economic market. Those representations
cannot achieve either end, however, if the press is inept in overseeing
them or if there is no external incentive for the press to proficiently
270
do so.
What the Sullivan Court failed to recognize is that it is not
just a fearless press that is imperative; the public needs, and the First
Amendment requires, a competent press as well.
This Article has argued that the tripartite interests in defamation
suits are not mutually exclusive. By using litigation costs to induce
responsible journalism, the Court can encourage practices that at
once protect plaintiffs’ reputations, shield the press from liability and
maximize media truth-telling. The result will be streamlined libel
litigation and an optimized, independent source of information. All
parties that have a stake in efficient and effective libel litigation are
thus bettered by the proposed summary proceeding, including the
referents of media speech, the public, the government, and,
certainly, the press itself.

268. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 769 (1985)
(White, J., concurring).
269. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667-68
(1990) (recognizing the unique role the press plays in informing and educating
citizens on matters of public concern); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn.
Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1983) (discussing the role of the press in
contributing to the rise of independence during the Revolution); Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (championing the press as a check against the abuses of
power by government officials and a means for keeping public officials responsible
for their actions).
270. See supra Part II.A for a full discussion on how the actual malice standard
promotes sloppy reporting because all a journalist needs to do to avoid liability is
show his or her state of mind and not the quality of work, and see supra Part II.B for
a full discussion on how excessive litigation costs unduly tie the hands of the media.

